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I. PANEL:  CONSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW OF POST-9/11 BARRIERS TO 
FREE SPEECH AND A FREE PRESS 
A. Nadine Strossen∗
I am delighted to chime in on this fascinating conversation about 
overview principles, and I would like to start by responding to a 
couple of the ideas that have been presented.  First, with respect to 
the constitutional text, I take a somewhat different approach from 
the fascinating one that Dean Rodney Smolla set out.  I think there is 
great significance to what the Constitution does say and what it does 
not say about special emergency powers, war powers, and so forth.  
Our Constitution’s Framers did not include a general emergency 
provision of the sort that Dean Claudio Grossman talked about, 
which is characteristic of not only international and regional human 
rights treaties, but also the constitutions of other modern 
democracies.  Those treaties and constitutions provide very stringent 
preconditions and strict judicial review for the exercise of emergency 
power.   
In contrast, I think it is striking that our Framers made an 
apparently deliberate decision to include no general emergency 
exception whatsoever to the usual constitutional framework for 
limiting government powers and securing individual rights.  I think it 
is apparent that this was an intentional decision because the Framers 
did include one very specific emergency exception.  That one 
exception allows Congress, under very narrow circumstances, limited 
to “Cases of Rebellion or Invasion,” to suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus “when . . . the public Safety may require it.”1  The fact that this 
“Suspension Clause” imposes such strict constraints upon the specific 
emergency exception that it authorizes bolsters the inference that 
there is no textual justification for a general emergency exception. 
It is not so interesting that I, the ACLU President, reached that 
conclusion; that should not be surprising.  I think it is far more 
interesting and surprising that the Supreme Court stressed that 
conclusion in its first post-9/11 decision, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.2  I had 
been very nervous about what this Supreme Court was going to do 
post-9/11.  In the Vietnam era, the Supreme Court did not decide 
these kinds of cases.  The most recent litigated situation was from 
 ∗  President, American Civil Liberties Union; Professor of Law, New York Law 
School; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1975; A.B., Harvard College, 1972. 
 1. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 2. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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World War II, where the Court pays lip service to applying strict 
scrutiny, and yet at the same time allows blatant racial discrimination 
and incarceration without demanding any evidence from the 
government.3  This shows that regardless of how strictly the tests are 
formulated, they can always be manipulated or paid lip service.  
Moreover, the Bush Administration argued that there should be no 
judicial review at all of its assertions of seemingly boundless executive 
power in the name of the “War on Terror.”  The Administration 
maintained that the Court should not hear any of these cases, and its 
fallback position was that if the Court did hear the cases, it should 
apply the rubber-stamping-type deference of the sort that we had 
seen in the past.  So, although Hamdi was hardly a perfect decision 
from a civil libertarian’s perspective, it was such an enormous relief 
given the historical background.  I could not agree more with both of 
my co-panelists that over time there has been an evolution of more 
judicial protection, for more individual rights, in more 
circumstances, including emergency circumstances. 
What I thought was particularly striking was that, of all the different 
opinions in the Hamdi case, the one that most strongly stood up for 
individual rights protected by courts, even in times of emergency, was 
the dissent authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, with the strange 
bedfellow of Justice John Paul Stevens joining the opinion.4  This is 
also very encouraging.  That the Court’s most outspoken conservative 
joined the Court’s most outspoken liberal shows that these issues of 
individual liberty and checks against government abuses of power do 
not fall along the usual ideological or partisan political divides.  One 
of the points that the Scalia-Stevens opinion heavily stressed was the 
point that I noted earlier, that the Constitution itself provides only 
one exception for only one right in times of war:  Congress’s power to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 
Dean Rodney Smolla stopped talking about precedents somewhere 
around the late-1960s, or perhaps at the beginning of the 1970s, so 
he did not talk about what I think is the most important precedent 
for free speech protection in times of war, the Pentagon Papers case.5  
That case took place in 1971, while the United States was still 
engaged in the Vietnam War.  The Nixon Administration made very 
serious claims about how publishing the Pentagon Papers would 
undermine the war effort and national security.  Notably, these claims 
were accepted by not only the dissenting Justices, but also two Justices 
 3. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 4. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 5. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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in the majority.  All five of these Justices accepted the 
Administration’s claims that there would be a series of specific harms 
that would occur through the publication of the Pentagon Papers, 
including killing of American soldiers overseas and interference with 
diplomatic efforts to end the war.  There is a very short so-called “per 
curiam opinion” for the Court as a whole, followed by nine separate 
opinions.  Although a majority of five Justices actually agreed with the 
government’s assertion that the publication of these papers would 
lead to enormous harms, including undermining national security, 
six Justices still voted against restricting freedom of speech in that 
case. 
As other commentators, including Dean Rodney Smolla and 
Professor Thomas Healy, have suggested,  even though the tests for 
various kinds of free speech restrictions are formulated somewhat 
differently, they essentially are all variations on the theme of strict 
scrutiny.  Therefore, while the Pentagon Papers case specifically 
addresses prior restraints,  and while Brandenburg v. Ohio6 specifically 
addresses incitement, they both use versions of strict judicial scrutiny.  
The details of the Court’s analytical framework in each of these 
particular factual contexts may be different, but the overall concept is 
the same.  Any restriction on freedom of speech is presumptively 
unconstitutional, and the government must bear a very heavy burden 
of proof, an appropriately heavy burden of proof, to overcome that 
presumption of unconstitutionality.   
Strict scrutiny is, of course, a two-part test.  First, the government 
must show that there is an interest of compelling importance.  
Second, the government must show that the restriction is narrowly 
tailored, indeed necessary, in order to protect or promote that 
compelling interest, which in the post-9/11 situation is national 
security.  The courts often say that the government has to use the 
least restrictive alternative.  If it could promote national security 
without such a heavy invasion into First Amendment freedoms, then 
the government has to use that less restrictive alternative. 
One thing that I like about this strict scrutiny test is that it reflects 
just plain common sense.  After all, why should the government get 
the power to restrict our freedom if it is not necessary, if the 
government could effectively promote our national security with less 
of an invasion on our freedom?  Why should we sacrifice freedom 
when that sacrifice is not necessary to promote national security?  
That would not be a logical tradeoff.  Therefore, I especially 
 6. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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appreciate one of the recommendations from the unanimous report 
of the bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States, commonly known as the Citizens’ Commission on 
9/11, which essentially said that this form of strict judicial scrutiny 
should be used as a matter of good common sense, good policy, and 
good governance.7   
The first prong of that test is very easy to satisfy.  It was easy to 
satisfy in the Pentagon Papers case, and it is easy to satisfy post-9/11:  
protecting national security is a compelling interest.  Where the 
rubber hits the road, and where the debate occurs, regards that 
second prong:  is this measure actually necessary?  In addressing the 
second prong, we should consider that many of the measures that are 
touted as advancing national security have been criticized, including 
by national security experts, as not even being effective, let alone 
necessary. Worse yet, too many such measures are even 
counterproductive to national security,  according to national 
security experts.  These concerns specifically apply to many of the 
post-911 First Amendment restrictions.   
These kinds of considerations were cited in a number of the 
separate opinions in the Pentagon Papers case.  As several Justices 
observed in that case, national security and freedom of speech go 
hand in hand.  When the government denies the public access to 
information, which is the common theme of so many of the First 
Amendment violations we are fighting now, it actually undermines 
national security.  Let us consider a few of the statements that the 
Supreme Court issued in this vein in the Pentagon Papers case,  
because it is the leading precedent.  These statements are completely 
applicable to the current situation.  I hope that when these issues get 
to the Supreme Court, the Court will be guided by these kinds of 
statements.  Justice Hugo Black wrote:  “The guarding of military and 
diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative 
government provides no real security for our Republic.”8  As 
Congressman Scott noted earlier, even Congress cannot get basic 
information from the current Administration, and our elected 
representatives cannot make rational and informed decisions about 
national security if they do not get this basic information.   
Justice William O. Douglas expanded on this core insight by noting 
that our elected representatives cannot and will not correct their 
mistakes so long as the mistakes remain hidden under a veil of 
 7. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT 394–95 (2004).
 8. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 719. 
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secrecy imposed for the asserted purpose of promoting national 
security, but that really had a completely different purpose.9  
Government officials are perennially tempted to use government 
secrecy to cover-up embarrassing information, which we saw when 
one of my heroes, Coleen Rowley, blew the whistle on cover-ups of 
mistakes and misconduct in the FBI.  Cautioning against such abuse 
in his opinion in the Pentagon Papers case, Justice Douglas wrote, 
“Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic, 
perpetuating bureaucratic errors.”10  He goes on to say, “The 
dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the 
widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing 
information.”11  In light of history, we have to be alert to the pattern 
of how and why the government actually uses its powers to impose 
secrecy.  Is the power used to protect “We the People,” or is it really a 
cover-up for mistakes or misconduct by government officials?   
Justice Potter Stewart’s opinion in the Pentagon Papers case 
contained the most subtle, and I think the most intriguing, argument 
about the negative interrelationship between government secrecy and 
national security.  He explained that a system of excessive secrecy 
quickly deteriorates into one, seemingly paradoxically, of inadequate 
secrecy.  As he stated:  
When everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the 
system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical . . . and to be 
manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion. . 
. .  [T]he hallmark of a truly effective internal security system would 
be the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can 
best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained.12
These general insights about the positive impact that reducing 
secrecy has on national security were specifically endorsed by the 
bipartisan Citizens’ Commission on 9/11.  The Commission 
determined that unjustified government secrecy, including over-
classification, had undermined national security pre-9/11.  It 
suggested that if more information had been more widely shared, not 
only among government agencies, but also with the public, the press, 
and Congress, then there would have been a greater chance of 
connecting the dots, potentially even averting the terrible tragedy on 
9/11.  Therefore, moving forward, in the interest of preventing 
another such catastrophe, the 9/11 Commission expressly 
 9. Id. at 720–24 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 10. Id. at 724. 
 11. Id. at 723–24. 
 12. Id. at 729 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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recommended more government openness.  It said, “Secrecy stifles 
oversight, accountability, and information sharing.  Unfortunately, all 
the current organizational incentives encourage over-classification.  
This balance should change . . . .”13 I have to underscore that this 
recommendation was made not in the spirit of promoting civil 
liberties, which is the ACLU’s mandate, but rather in the spirit of 
promoting national security.  In short, this is a vivid example of the 
mutually reinforcing relationship between First Amendment 
freedoms and national security. 
Some of the Justices’ individual opinions in the Pentagon Papers 
case recognize another fundamental constitutional principle at stake.  
Protecting the free flow of information and countering undue 
government secrecy are essential underpinnings, not only of 
individual freedom, but also of our whole government system of 
checks and balances.  A free press that has access to, and the right to 
publish information about Executive Branch policies, is a critical 
pillar of both congressional oversight and judicial review.  Conversely, 
when the Executive Branch stifles or withholds information from the 
other branches of government, as well as from the public, that 
corrodes our fundamental political system, as well as individual 
freedom.  Unfortunately, this is exactly what the Executive Branch 
has been doing since 9/11, as Congressman Scott lamented.  In fact, 
this Administration has been so stubborn in refusing to provide basic 
information to Congress, and so disdainful of Congress’s requests for 
information, that it has earned the criticism of even conservative 
Republicans, who substantively support the Administration’s policies.  
As they complain, the Administration’s withholding of information 
undermines their ability to perform their essential functions as our 
elected representatives, including their responsibilities to maintain 
oversight of the Executive Branch. 
In my limited time, I would like to mention two illustrations of this 
vital interrelationship between the First Amendment freedoms and 
our government system of checks and balances.  I am going to focus 
on the courts because under the structure of the Constitution, the 
courts are designed to serve as the ultimate safety net, especially at 
times of crisis when the branches of government that are politically 
accountable tend to be timorous and to act based on expediency 
rather than principle. 
 13. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT:  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report 
_Exec.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2008). 
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As I previously mentioned, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, many 
federal judges fortunately have ruled in favor of the ACLU’s cases 
that challenge abuses of government power and defend individual 
liberty, including freedom of speech.  The first illustration is one very 
important victory that we won exactly two weeks ago today, when a 
federal judge struck down a provision of the Patriot Act under both 
the First Amendment and a separation of powers principle,14 
specifically the judicial review powers introduced by Marbury v. 
Madison.15  In Doe v. Gonzales,16 Judge Victor Marrero of the U.S 
District Court for the Southern District of New York quoted from 
Marbury v. Madison repeatedly in his opinion invalidating the section 
of the Patriot Act that authorizes secret surveillance under National 
Security Letters or “NSL’s.”  This provision imposed gag orders on all 
Internet Service Providers, librarians and others who receive NSL’s 
seeking information about their patrons’ communications.  Judge 
Marrero struck down this provision specifically because of its tight 
constraints on judicial review.  He stressed the vital interrelationship 
between the judicial review power and the First Amendment 
freedoms that the NSL provision violated.    For example, Judge 
Marrero wrote: 
The Constitution was designed so that the dangers of any given 
moment would never suffice as justification for discarding 
fundamental individual liberties or circumscribing the judiciary’s 
unique role under our governmental system in protecting those 
liberties and upholding the rule of law.  It is the judiciary’s 
independent function to uphold the Constitution even if to do so 
may mean curtailing Congress’s efforts to confer greater freedom 
on the executive to investigate national security threats.17
In short, through the power of judicial review, Judge Marrero was 
able to enforce both First Amendment rights and the judicial review 
power itself, reinforcing the positive interrelationship between them. 
As a second illustration of the relationship between the First 
Amendment and judicial review, let me give you an example of the 
dark side, the glass half-empty perspective.  It shows how the judicial 
review power can be thwarted through undue Executive Branch 
secrecy, thus undermining both checks and balances and First 
Amendment freedoms.  I am specifically referring to how judicial 
review power has been completely frustrated to an alarming extent by 
 14. Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 15. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 16. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379. 
 17.  Id. at 414–15. 
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the government’s abuse of, and many courts’ acceptance of, the “state 
secrets privilege.”  As a result, the Executive Branch has effectively 
been immunized from any judicial review of even the most egregious 
violations of constitutional rights, including First Amendment 
freedoms.  Such abuses are analyzed in the powerful new report put 
together by James Tucker and his ACLU colleagues, which refers to 
such acts as “governing in the shadows.”18  While this topic is not as 
well known as it should be, Louis Fisher has written a book on this 
subject, In the Name of National Security,19 which I recommend to you. 
In its origin, the state secrets privilege was designed to protect 
particular pieces of evidence that were shown to be dangerous to 
national security if they came to light.  That narrow application has 
been completely expanded, distorted, and exaggerated, so the 
privilege is now being used systematically to completely dismiss cases 
before the introduction of any evidence, even cases claiming 
enormous abuses of the most fundamental human rights, including 
rendition to countries that we know engage in torture. 
This has become such a serious problem that, after considerable 
deliberation and risk analysis, the ACLU decided to ask the United 
States Supreme Court to review this issue in two cases, one of which 
directly involved the First Amendment.20  The ACLU reached this 
decision because we believe that the overblown use of the state 
secrets privilege is such a serious threat to all freedoms, including 
First Amendment rights.  Further, we believe that there is a likelihood 
that the Supreme Court, being part of an independent branch of 
government with an investment in defending checks and balances, 
will re-examine and cut back on the abuse of this privilege to 
undermine both individual rights and the judicial review power to 
enforce individual rights.  Let me read just the closing lines in one of 
the ACLU’s briefs seeking Supreme Court review of this issue, to give 
you a flavor of what is at stake.  Under cover of the government’s 
distorted, exaggerated view of the state secrets privilege, our brief 
writes,  
. . . [T]he government may engage in torture, declare it a state 
secret, and by virtue of that designation avoid any judicial 
 18. JAMES THOMAS TUCKER & SOPHIE ALCORN, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
RECLAIMING OUR RIGHTS:  DECLARATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND GRIEVANCES 
2 (2007), http://www.aclu.org/symposium/reclaiming_our_rights.pdf. 
 19. LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY:  UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE (2006). 
 20. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 128 S. Ct. 373 
(2007); Edmonds v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F.Supp.2d 65 (D.D.C.), aff’d  161 Fed. 
App’x. 6 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 46 U.S. 1031 (2005). 
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accountability for conduct that even the government purports to 
condemn as unlawful under all circumstances.  Under a system 
predicated on respect for the rule of law, the government has no 
privilege to violate our most fundamental legal norms, and it 
should not be able to do so with impunity based on a state secrets 
privilege that was developed to achieve very different ends.21
In conclusion, I would like to return to the Pentagon Papers case, 
the leading case on press freedom, the First Amendment, and 
national security.  I would like to quote the federal trial judge who 
issued the first opinion in the case, Judge Murray Gurfein of the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York.22  I think it is 
very notable that he was a former prosecutor who had a significant 
background in military intelligence.  It is especially noteworthy that, 
with that background, Judge Gurfein strongly rejected the 
government’s claims that First Amendment principles should yield to 
national security concerns, rejecting the notion that these are 
antithetical concepts.  As he declared: 
 The security of the Nation is not at the ramparts alone.  Security 
also lies in the value of our free institutions.  A cantankerous press, 
an obstinate press, an ubiquitous press must be suffered by those in 
authority in order to preserve the even greater values of freedom of 
expression and the right of the people to know. . . . Yet in the last 
analysis it is not merely the opinion of the editorial writer or of the 
columnist which is protected by the First Amendment. It is the free 
flow of information so that the public will be informed about the 
Government and its actions.23
II. PANEL:  RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION THROUGH 
MATERIAL SUPPORT PROHIBITIONS AND VISA DENIALS 
A. David Cole∗
I am delighted to be here at the Washington College of Law, one of 
the nation’s leaders in fighting for human rights and educating on 
the subject of human rights.  I am also honored to be on a panel with 
representatives of the American Civil Liberties Union and PEN 
American Center.  One of my first cases as a young lawyer at the 
Center for Constitutional Rights was working with PEN American 
 21. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, El-Masri, 128 S. Ct. 373 (No. 06-1613). 
 22. United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y.) rev’d en banc per 
curiam, 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), rev’d, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 23. Id. at 331. 
 ∗  Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., Yale Law School, 1984; 
B.A., Yale University, 1980. 
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Center and the ACLU in defending Margaret Randall.  Margaret was 
an American-born poet who obtained Mexican citizenship in the 
1960s and lived abroad for a long time.  She wrote many books very 
critical of the United States and when she decided she wanted to 
come back, the United States government initiated deportation 
proceedings against her for her political views.24  She was accused of 
having advocated world communism in her poetry and her journals.  
This was not 1954, but 1984.  But her case was a holdover from the 
guilt by association days of the McCarthy era.     
In the 1950s, we were afraid of Communism.  We were afraid, in 
particular, of the Soviet Union, the world’s second greatest 
superpower, which was armed with masses of nuclear warheads aimed 
at all our largest cities.  As a result, we fought the Cold War, engaged 
in espionage, proxy wars, and an arms race.  We also took aggressive 
preventive measures at home.  The principal preventive measure of 
that period was guilt by association.  We made it a crime to be a 
member of the Communist Party, and we created a whole 
administrative scheme to implement and enforce this notion of guilt 
by association. 
There were a handful of criminal prosecutions of some leaders of 
the Communist Party, and they had a substantial chilling effect.  Yet 
more effective than the criminal prosecutions were the administrative 
mechanisms created to make sure that this theory was infused deeply 
throughout society.  President Truman issued an Executive Order 
that required loyalty inquiry boards to investigate the political 
ideologies, affiliations, and magazine subscription practices of 
virtually all federal employees.25  Many private businesses that worked 
with the federal government also had to undertake these loyalty 
inquisitions.  The House on Un-American Activities Committee 
(“HUAC”) held congressional hearings, and encouraged the 
development of a partnership between public and private entities in 
the name of political repression.  The HUAC would “out” people as 
communists and then private industry, notably Hollywood, would 
blacklist those individuals from getting any jobs.  In the end, millions 
of Americans were affected.  It is now well accepted that guilt by 
association was a gross overreaction adopted in the name of 
prevention. 
Today, the threat is terrorism, not communism.  And as a doctrinal 
matter at least, guilt by association is barred by the First and Fifth 
 24. Randall v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 25. Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (Mar. 21, 1947). 
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Amendments.  But we nonetheless see a remarkably similar reaction 
in place.  Instead of targeting association expressly, the government 
targets “material support” for terrorist organizations.  But the 
essential features of this prohibition are the same.  The government 
employs an extremely broad criminal substantive standard—material 
support—which encompasses any activity in association with a group 
classified as a terrorist organization.  Giving the organization money 
is the most obvious example of material support, but even the 
volunteering of one’s time also constitutes material support. 
We not only have a broad criminal statute,26 but we also have 
administrative and public-private partnership schemes for 
implementing this prohibition.  The Secretary of State, through an 
administrative process, designates foreign terrorist organizations, and 
the Secretary of the Treasury, through another administrative 
process, identifies another list of proscribed terrorist groups, which 
now includes over 1,000 names.  The Treasury Department also 
facilitates public-private partnerships by setting forth “voluntary 
guidelines” that charities, foundations, and businesses are 
encouraged to employ when they are doing their business.27
Attorney General John Ashcroft called this the “paradigm of 
prevention.”28  He argued that when you are facing terrorists who are 
willing to commit suicide to inflict mass casualties on civilians, it is 
not enough to bring them to justice after the fact; we have to prevent 
the next terrorist attack from occurring.  Of course, we all want to 
prevent the next terrorist attack from occurring; no one wants to see 
another 9/11.  But the measures that the Administration has taken in 
furtherance of this preventive paradigm are quite extreme.29  They 
include preventive detention.  And in my view, the material support 
statute is a form of preventive detention. 
The material support statutes hold people responsible, not for 
what they have done in the past—the material support itself may be 
negligible and there need be no showing that it has actually 
furthered any kind of terrorist activity— but rather out of the fear 
that they or those they support might do something bad in the 
 26. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 27. Anti-terrorist Financing Guidelines:  Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based 
Charities, 71 Fed. Reg. 63,838 (Dep’t of the Treasury Oct. 31, 2006). 
 28. John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the Council on 
Foreign Relations (Feb. 10, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2003 
/021003agcouncilonforeignrelation.htm. 
 29.  See generally DAVID COLE AND JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA 
IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2007) (cataloguing compromises on the rule of law 
prompted by Bush administration measures in the “war on terror”).   
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future.  As such, these statutes permit a kind of de facto preventive 
detention, implemented through the rubric of the criminal law.   
The material support statutes raise a host of constitutional 
problems, both in terms of how groups and individuals get 
designated as terrorist in the first place, and with respect to the 
sanctions then imposed on anyone who supports a designated entity.  
The initial designation process is a largely secret administrative 
process.  Groups first learn that they have been designated as a 
terrorist group through a notice published in the Federal Register.  
Groups and individuals overseas may be listed without any notice or 
opportunity to respond whatsoever.  Groups and individuals in the 
United States are entitled by due process to some notice and 
opportunity to respond, but the opportunity is largely a sham; groups 
are not permitted to confront their accusers, are not provided a 
hearing, and are typically designated on the basis of secret evidence 
that they have no chance to see or rebut.  Designations are simply 
announced, and the government publishes no statement of reasons 
or explanation for why any particular entity was designated 
A designated entity may bring a challenge to its designation in 
court.  But it cannot introduce any evidence in that challenge, and it 
generally cannot see the government’s evidence, which if classified is 
presented to the judge behind closed doors and outside the presence 
of the designated entity or its lawyers.  Not surprisingly, no 
organization has successfully challenged its designation as a terrorist 
group. 
I am currently representing a group that has not yet been 
designated but is under investigation for possible designation, and I 
will describe briefly the process that we have been through.  About 
two years ago, the federal government shut down the organization, 
froze all its assets, and seized all its documents and records.  It did so 
without any finding—or even allegation—of wrongdoing.  The fact of 
the investigation was enough. 
Because this is an American group, as noted above, it is entitled to 
some notice, and to submit in writing materials in its defense.  To 
that end, the government produced a short stack of documents that it 
said constituted its “administrative record” regarding the 
organization.  Approximately 95 percent of the documents do not 
even name the organization that we are representing.  There are 
indictments of other organizations, and miscellaneous documents 
referring to other organizations.  But there is no explanation as to 
what these documents have to do with our client, or of what, if 
anything, our client is alleged to have done to warrant being placed 
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under investigation.  We are left to guess in the dark at the 
government’s concerns.   
But it is worse than that.  The government has also informed us 
that it is relying on classified evidence that it cannot tell us about.  So 
we must defend the group without knowing the accusations against it, 
and without seeing most of the evidence in the file.   
We do have an opportunity to submit whatever we want—in 
writing—in our defense.  The only problem is that we do not know 
what the charges are, what the evidence is, and they have all our 
documents.  (Laughter)  So we wrote to them and said, “We would 
actually like to get access to our own documents so that we might 
prepare a defense.”  They replied that the U.S. Attorney sees those, 
not Treasury, so you will have to deal with the U.S. Attorney.  When 
we wrote to the U.S. Attorney, he said, “I do not have any interest in 
the Treasury Department and so I am not going to let you see the 
documents.”  So much for due process in the designation of terrorist 
groups.30
The second set of constitutional issues raised by the material 
support statutes relates to the prohibitions on support that are 
triggered by a designation.  The principal concern here is that 
because the prohibition on “material support” is so sweeping, it 
effectively imposes guilt by association.  An example is another case I 
am handling.  I represent the Humanitarian Law Project, a thirty-
year-old human rights group in Los Angeles, which has been working 
with the Kurds in Turkey for a long time.  The Kurds are a much-
abused group in Turkey.  The Humanitarian Law Project was working 
with them to teach them how to advocate for human rights, for 
example, training them in petitioning the United Nations, going to 
the Human Rights Committee, and putting forward a case.31  In 
particular, the Project worked with the Kurdistan Workers Party 
because it is the principal political representative of the Kurds in 
Turkey.  In 1997, however, the United States designated the 
Kurdistan Workers Party as a terrorist organization.  It then became a 
crime for my clients to continue to teach the Kurdistan Workers Party 
how to advocate for human rights.  Even though my clients had no 
intention of furthering terrorism, even though they were actually 
seeking to discourage a resort to violence by encouraging the use of 
 30.  In May 2007, the government provided us with a DVD containing copies of 
the organization’s seized records – but it did so under a protective order barring us 
from sharing the documents with our clients absent another court order.  Thus, the 
government’s position is that the clients cannot even review their own documents for 
their defense without getting specific document-by-document permission. 
 31. E.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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peaceful means to resolve conflicts, that is no defense.  Material 
support is prohibited regardless of its purpose, and is defined to 
include all “training,” all “expert advice and assistance,” and all 
“services” of any kind whatsoever. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit has declared these aspects of the material 
support statute unconstitutional, finding that they are hopelessly 
vague and potentially criminalize a wide range of speech and 
associational activities.  
The material support statutes raise First and Fifth Amendment 
concerns.  The First Amendment guarantees the right to associate 
with groups that engage in both lawful and unlawful activity, as long 
as one does not intentionally further their unlawful activities.  And 
yet these statutes do not in any way distinguish between support that 
is designed to further illegal activities and support that is designed to 
further legal activities. 
Second, these statutes raise concerns of vagueness and 
overbreadth.  What do the prohibitions on training, expert advice 
and assistance, or services really bar?  If they are as broad as they 
seem, then they are constitutionally overbroad, because they prohibit 
virtually all First Amendment activity in support of one of these 
organizations.  The government tries to avoid that conclusion by 
contending that individuals are not prohibiting advocacy “on behalf 
of” a designated organization.  But at the same time, the government 
maintains that the prohibition on providing “services” encompasses  
anything done “for the benefit of” the organization.  So one can 
advocate on behalf of a group, but if it turns out that one was 
advocating “for the benefit of” the group, a crime has been 
committed.  And if one thinks his advocacy is on behalf of, but the 
jury finds that it was actually for the benefit of, he may go to jail for 
fifteen years. 
These laws—imposed in secret designation processes, and carrying 
sweeping criminal prohibitions—cause a tremendous chilling effect 
throughout the Muslim community.  As these laws demonstrate, the 
preventive paradigm pushes the government to sweep broadly 
because it does not know where the threat lies, and it is so afraid of 
the threat that it is willing to impose penalties on a broad spectrum of 
actors.  I do not think that is a very effective strategy for a variety of 
reasons that I would be happy to go into in question-and-answer, but 
I am certain that it is an unconstitutional strategy.  Thank you very 
much. 
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III. PANEL:  CENSORING AND PROSECUTING THE PRESS—AN 
ASSESSMENT OF REPORTERS’ SHIELD LEGISLATION 
A. Steven D. Clymer∗
I would like to start by thanking the American University Law Review, 
and the American Civil Liberties Union for inviting me to participate 
in this panel.  It is a real privilege to be involved in issues that are as 
timely and as important as those that are being discussed here. 
As the agenda indicates, I have two careers.  I am a professor of law 
at Cornell Law School, and I am also a federal prosecutor with the 
Department of Justice.  In connection with the latter position, I want 
to make one thing clear.  What I say today is my own opinion, not the 
position of the Department of Justice.  That is a very important point 
because if I say anything that you think is intelligent or insightful, 
please give me full credit and not the Department of Justice.  
(Laughter) 
I want to be a little different than the other speakers here today.  
Most of the speakers, with the exception of Jim Tucker, have taken a 
position consistent with the ACLU’s position on the topic.  He played 
devil’s advocate for us.  I am not going to play devil’s advocate; I am 
going to be the devil’s advocate.  (Laughter)  I am going to tell you 
that the ACLU position on the reporters’ privilege is misguided for a 
number of reasons.  I am going to give you five reasons why I think it 
is wrong.  I will try to be brief because I would like to give you all an 
opportunity to persuade me that I am wrong or to tell me that I am 
right. 
My first point has to do with the title of this panel.  This panel is 
entitled “Censoring and Prosecuting the Press.”  That title really 
bothers me because the issues about the reporters’ privilege have 
nothing to do with either press censorship or with prosecuting the 
members of the press.  Characterizing it that way may be a nice 
rhetorical flourish, but it distorts, rather than illuminates the issues 
that we ought to be talking about.  What is at issue with reporters’ 
privilege is something quite different.  At issue is whether reporters 
should have a privilege, not available to most other witnesses, to 
refuse lawful court orders that they testify before a grand jury or 
before a court. 
 ∗  Professor of Law (on leave), Cornell Law School; United States Attorney’s 
Office, Northern District of New York; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1983; B.A., Cornell 
University, 1980. 
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In the case of most witnesses, when they get a court order to testify 
they must testify or go to jail.  They must testify even if that testimony 
may embarrass them, humiliate them, if it may be against their 
interest, or if it may incriminate their family members or their 
friends.  That is the rule for everybody in this country.  The objective 
of the reporters’ privilege is to treat reporters differently.  My first 
point is that we must be honest about what we are talking about.  We 
are talking about whether we should carve out a special legal rule that 
applies to reporters, but does not apply to most other witnesses. 
As I understand it, the argument for this special privilege is not to 
benefit reporters, nor to benefit their sources.  The argument is that 
it will benefit the public because it will increase the free flow of 
information to the public.  That argument has two steps.  Step one 
notes that confidential sources are the lifeblood of a free, 
independent, and vigorous press.  Without confidential sources, 
reporters are reduced to simply regurgitating official versions of news 
events, versions that may be incomplete or inadequate.  I agree 
wholeheartedly with that opinion.  I do not take issue with the claim 
that confidential sources are essential in a free country and that the 
press must be able to rely on confidential sources. 
It is the second step in the argument where there is a problem.  
The second step of the argument states that unless reporters can give 
their sources absolute, unqualified assurances of confidentiality, 
those sources will no longer give information to reporters.  My 
second point is that this proposition is not supported by any solid 
empirical evidence.  There is no proof that a federal journalists’ 
privilege is necessary to persuade sources to leak information.  To put 
it differently, there is no evidence that the absence of such a 
privilege, which has been the law for years and years, prevents sources 
from coming forward. 
Today Congressman Pence reminded us about the Watergate leak 
and recalled how important that leak was.  He asserted that the law 
was different then.  He was flat out wrong about that; the law was not 
different.  The law at that time was the same as the current law.  The 
Supreme Court has never recognized a First Amendment privilege or 
a common-law privilege in the context of criminal investigations or 
grand-jury investigations.  Congress has never recognized a federal 
reporters’ privilege, so the law has not changed. 
Yet for many years, including very recently, we have had extremely 
important leaks.  In fact, even with the prominence of the reporters’ 
privilege in the news reports, we have seen some of the most 
important leaks in decades come very recently, including leaks about 
  
1220 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1203 
                                                          
secret CIA prisons in Europe, leaks about warrantless wiretapping, 
and leaks about abuses at Abu Ghraib prison.  The absence of a 
federal reporters’ privilege did nothing to deter those sources from 
leaking that very important information, and nothing to keep you, 
the public, from getting that information.  My second point is that it 
is not clear that an absolute guarantee of confidentiality is necessary 
to have sources leak information.  This makes sense because there is 
an extremely small possibility that a reporter will be subpoenaed to 
give testimony about the source.  Not only is it very unlikely to 
happen, but in fact, many sources may never even ask for that sort of 
assurance.  We do not need that sort of assurance to get the free flow 
of information to the public. 
My third point is that at the same time a reporters’ privilege is not 
necessary, to have it would be very costly.  There are real costs in 
terms of the loss of reliable, probative evidence to litigants, to courts, 
and to grand juries by having a reporters’ privilege.  What does that 
mean on the ground?  It means people who are civil litigants and who 
have suffered damages would be unable to make their claims.  Steven 
Hatfill, whose reputation has been destroyed by leaks in the press, 
would be unable to recover despite the fact that those leaks may have 
violated federal law.32  It means criminal defendants may be unable to 
establish their innocence in court because they cannot gain access to 
exculpatory evidence that might be in a reporter’s possession.  It 
means that grand juries would not be able to solve crimes, and that 
courts and trial juries would be denied evidence important to make 
decisions about the guilt or innocence of criminal defendants. 
My fourth point regards the claim that it is the public that benefits 
from the reporters’ privilege.  In fact, the party that will benefit 
enormously from a reporters’ privilege is the government official who 
improperly leaks information in violation of the law.  Whether we 
want to admit it or not, most whistleblowers are not Good Samaritans.  
Many whistleblowers have their own private manipulative agendas for 
leaking information to the press.  Let me give you some examples. 
Suppose as a federal prosecutor, I am doing a criminal 
investigation in front of the grand jury and I do not have enough 
evidence to indict a person.  However, I really want to get this target 
because I do not like this target; I think he is a crook, but I am 
frustrated because I cannot indict him.  So I could pick up my 
telephone, call a reporter, and leak secret grand-jury transcripts to 
that reporter who could now write a story that would destroy the 
 32. Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005). 
  
2008] LEFT OUT IN THE COLD? 1221 
career or the reputation, or both, of this target.  What does a 
reporters’ privilege do in this situation?  It guarantees that I will never 
be prosecuted for that crime.  If a congressman, for purely partisan 
reasons, wants to leak classified information, perhaps to influence an 
election that is coming up, he can now have one of those off-the-
record conversations with a reporter.  If there is a reporters’ privilege, 
he can sleep soundly at night knowing that he is immune from 
prosecution. 
Why does it immunize a leaker from prosecution?  If the 
investigators go to the leaker, the leaker can assert his Fifth 
Amendment privilege and not have to give any information.  The 
reporter, if there is a reporters’ privilege, can assert the reporters’ 
privilege and not have to give any information.  If it is a two-party 
conversation, there is no other source of information to solve this 
crime.  The people who will benefit from a reporters’ privilege, other 
than supposedly the public, are government officials with access to 
secret information who decide to violate the laws and leak that 
information for their own personal or political agendas. 
Those are my first four points; let me summarize them quickly.  
Number one, let us be honest that what we are talking about.  It is not 
prosecution, it is not censorship; it is whether reporters should enjoy 
some special privilege generally unavailable to other witnesses.  
Number two, it is not necessary to encourage leaks to have a 
reporters’ privilege; leaks occur all the time without the privilege and 
have for many years.  Number three, a journalist’s privilege is very 
costly and it is going to necessarily result in injustices in both the 
criminal and civil justice systems.  And fourthly, such a privilege will 
safeguard government officials who illegally leak information for 
their own purposes.  I will assume that some, or perhaps even all of 
you, are not persuaded by any of those assertions. 
I also want to raise a fifth argument.  I want to engage you on a 
value that I have and I suspect that all of you hold; a value of 
protecting the First Amendment.  Because you are here at a 
conference about the First Amendment, I am going to bet that all of 
you value the First Amendment and are interested in protecting the 
free flow of information to the public.  In other words, you are 
opposed to legal rules that prevent information from coming to the 
public.  I want to persuade you that the reporters’ privilege is that 
very thing.  The reporters’ privilege is a rule that will deny members 
of the public very important information they ought to have, 
information about the way the government operates and other 
newsworthy stories. 
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Here are several potential newsworthy stories.  Story number one: 
High-level Executive Branch officials conspire together to discredit a 
critic of the Administration.  As part of their plot, they decide to 
selectively leak information, some of which may be classified, to 
members of the press.  Story number two:  A prominent criminal 
defense attorney violates a court order and releases secret grand-jury 
testimony in violation of the court order, thereby destroying the 
reputations of people who gave that grand-jury testimony.  In court, 
the attorney then falsely denies that he leaked the information and, 
in fact, accuses the prosecution of leaking the information, thereby 
trying to obstruct justice in a criminal case.  Story number three:  The 
government is investigating a successful scientist as a possible threat 
to national security.  Before any charges are brought, government 
officials leak information about their investigation, which destroys the 
career and reputation of the scientist. 
I think we could all agree that all three of those stories are stories 
you would want to read about in the newspaper; we would want to 
know what is going on in those cases.  Surely we would want to know 
about high-level government officials plotting to discredit a critic, a 
rogue criminal defense attorney trying to obstruct justice, and 
government officials who leak information to destroy a scientist’s 
career without the presence of any charges against him. 
You probably have figured out that these stories are all true.  The 
first story is the Administration’s leak of information about Joseph 
Wilson, a former ambassador, who was a critic of the Bush 
Administration, in what we now call the Valerie Plame affair.  The 
second story is the BALCO leak investigation, that Professor Eliason 
has written about, where a criminal defense attorney named Troy 
Ellerman violated a court order and released grand-jury information.  
He then lied about it to the court and obstructed justice when he 
accused the government of leaking the information he himself had 
leaked.  The third story could be the Wen Ho Lee story, who filed a 
Privacy Act suit33 because information about his investigation of 
stealing secrets about U.S. nuclear arsenals and giving them to China 
was leaked, or it could be the Stephen Hatfill story, the scientist who 
was suspected in the anthrax mail investigation and has also filed a 
Privacy Act suit. 
All these stories have something in common.  In all these cases, a 
well-financed entity has fought tooth and nail to keep information 
about these leaks from the public, and consequently has tried to deny 
 33. Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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the public free access to the information.  It was not the government; 
it was not criminal defense attorneys; it was the press organizations.  
Those organizations tried to conceal the true nature of the 
relationship between Administration officials and friendly reporters 
in the Plame investigation.  They tried to keep the fact that Troy 
Ellerman was working with reporters who were fully aware of his 
crimes, but yet continued to publish stories and work with him 
regarding the disclosed grand-jury information.  They have tried to 
keep from you the identity and the circumstances of the leaks in Lee 
v. Department of Justice34 and Hatfill v. New York Times Co.35 cases.  The 
tool that the press organizations have used to try to conceal that 
information from you is the reporters’ privilege by presenting claims 
in court that a reporters’ privilege protects the information. 
My final point is that press organizations correctly make the 
argument that the substance of leaked information is important for 
an educated public.  I agree with that, but at the same time, the 
circumstances of the leaks and the identity of the leakers are also 
important newsworthy facts for the public to know.  The reporters’ 
privilege conceals from the public information about the 
circumstances of the leak; what happened, for example, in the Plame 
case or the other cases, and the identity of the leakers; things that are 
also very newsworthy. 
I do not mean to suggest any bad intent or bad motive on the part 
of the press.  My point is that if our criterion is free flow of 
information to the press, there are costs to having a reporters’ 
privilege and the cost is very high, for two reasons.  First, it may 
prevent us from holding government officials accountable for their 
improper actions.  Second, as the BALCO case made very clear, it 
may also prevent us from holding the press accountable for its 
conduct, from knowing what sort of relationship reporters are 
forming with leakers and what sort of guarantees reporters are 
making.  That information is also important to have in a free society. 
Justice Brandeis once said “sunlight is . . . the best of disinfectants” 
for a government.36  A journalist’s privilege blocks that sunshine by 
preventing the public from knowing about circumstances of leaks 
and the identity of leakers.  It protects government officials who 
make those leaks.  As the BALCO case makes clear, sometimes the 
 34. Lee, 413 F.3d 53. 
 35. Hatfill, 416 F.3d 320. 
 36. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 
(A.M. Kelley 1986) (1914). 
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press could use a little sunshine itself, perhaps as a disinfectant.  I 
thank you for your attention. 
IV. PANEL:  SURVEILLANCE AND ITS IMPACT ON FIRST AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS 
A. Jameel Jaffer∗
Let me start by thanking the American University Law Review and my 
colleagues in Washington at the ACLU for inviting me to participate 
in this conference.   
The previous speakers are clearly right that it is impossible to 
quantify the chilling effect of government surveillance.  But it’s 
important to recognize that the chilling effect is not just an 
abstraction; it’s very real, especially in minority and immigrant 
communities that are already marginalized.  When the other panelists 
were speaking, I was thinking of a trip I took to Michigan in 2003.  
We were preparing to file a lawsuit37 challenging section 215 of the 
Patriot Act,38 a surveillance provision that allowed the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation unchecked access to records in the hands of political 
and advocacy organizations, libraries, bookstores, universities, 
hospitals, and Internet service providers.  We thought that the 
provision was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment 
because it allowed the FBI to compel the disclosure of records 
without judicial review.  We also thought that the provision violated 
the First Amendment because it categorically foreclosed any 
organization that received a section 215 order from disclosing to any 
other person that the FBI had served the order.39  We went to 
Michigan to meet with representatives of Muslim and Arab-American 
community organizations that were concerned about the Patriot Act 
and that had expressed an interest in challenging section 215’s 
constitutionality. 
 The thing I remember most vividly from that trip is how difficult it 
was to persuade the individual members of the community 
organizations to talk to us.  It wasn’t that they weren’t supportive of 
our work.  They were.  But they were afraid of attracting attention.  
The Immigration and Naturalization Service had rounded up 
 ∗  Director, American Civil Liberties Union’s National Securities Project; J.D., 
Harvard Law School. 
 37. Muslim Cmty. Ass’n v. Ashcroft, No. 03-CV-72913 (E.D. Mich. filed July 30, 
2003). 
 38. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 215, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1861-1862 (2008).   
 39. Id. § 1861(a)(1). 
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hundreds of Muslim men and held them without charges for months.  
Many of these men had been deported after secret hearings.  The 
people we approached hadn’t done anything wrong, but they were 
afraid that participating in a lawsuit, or even talking to the ACLU, 
could lead to similar consequences for themselves or their families.  
When we did manage to persuade some of these people to talk to us, 
they told us of the effect that the government’s policies had had on 
their own activities.  They had stopped going to political 
demonstrations, stopped writing letters to the newspapers, stopped 
giving money to their mosques.  They assumed—or at least feared—
that the government was keeping track of everything.  A doctor in his 
fifties told us that he had advised his son, a second-year university 
student, not to major in politics and not to join the Muslim Students 
Association because he thought that doing these things would invite 
government scrutiny.       
I don’t know how to reduce this kind of thing to a statistic.  It’s 
what I think of, though, when people suggest that the chilling effect 
is insignificant or overstated.  The truth is that government 
surveillance can have a profound chilling effect on individuals’ 
willingness to engage in activities that are protected by the First 
Amendment—activities that are necessary to the functioning of any 
democracy.  And this chilling effect falls most squarely on 
communities that are already marginized.   
There’s a long line of cases in which the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the threat of government surveillance can discourage 
legitimate political association, legitimate religious activity, and 
legitimate political dissent.  Here’s what Justice Powell wrote in the 
Keith40 case: 
 History abundantly documents the tendency of government—
however benevolent and benign its motives—to view with suspicion 
those who most fervently dispute its policies. . . . [T]he price of 
lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an 
unchecked surveillance power.  Nor must the fear of unauthorized 
official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion 
of Government action in private conversation.  For private dissent, 
no less than open discourse, is essential to our free society.41
The Keith case involved warrantless wiretaps; the question was 
whether such wiretaps were permissible if conducted for domestic 
intelligence purposes.  But the Court has recognized the connection 
between surveillance and the First Amendment in other contexts as 
 40. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
 41. Id. at 314. 
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well.  In NAACP v. Alabama42 and several other cases decided in the 
1950s and 1960s, the Court recognized that government access to the 
membership lists of political associations was likely to discourage 
people from joining those organizations.43  Similarly, in United States 
v. Rumely,44 the Court recognized that government access to book-
purchase records was likely to discourage people from buying 
controversial books. 
 One important insight from these cases is that, from a First 
Amendment perspective, the threat of government surveillance can be 
just as problematic—just as inhibiting of constitutionally protected 
activity—as the surveillance itself.  Incidentally, it was that same 
insight that animated Jeremy Bentham’s famous Panopticon, a prison 
that allowed a single guard, located in the center of the prison, to see 
into every cell.  The single guard could not possibly monitor all of the 
prisoners at once, but Bentham understood that prisoners would be 
intimidated and pacified by the mere possibility that the guard might 
be monitoring them.  From a First Amendment perspective, the 
problem with unchecked government surveillance is not just the 
surveillance itself; it’s also the possibility—the threat—of surveillance.        
The chilling effect doctrine reflects a similar insight.  In Rumely, the 
Supreme Court’s concern was not solely with the people who had 
already purchased controversial books and whose identities the 
government sought to obtain, but also with those who might be 
discouraged from purchasing controversial books because of the 
threat of future surveillance.  In his concurrence, Justice Douglas 
wrote, “Once the government can demand of a publisher the names 
of the purchasers of his publications, the free press as we know it 
disappears. Then the spectre of a government agent will look over the shoulder 
of everyone who reads.”45  Justice Douglas was concerned not just about 
the surveillance that the government was actually conducting but also 
about the surveillance that it could conduct—not just about the 
government agent but about the “spectre” of the agent as well.  
 It’s helpful to have that background in mind when you think about 
the surveillance cases that are in the courts now, and in particular the 
 42. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 43.  See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958) (“Inviolability of privacy in 
group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of 
freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”); see 
also Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544, 556–58 
(1963) (holding that there was not enough evidence of communist sympathy within 
the Miami chapter of the NAACP to override the privacy afforded to the group by 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments).  
 44. 345 U.S. 41 (1953). 
 45. Id. at 57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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cases relating to the National Security Agency’s warrantless 
wiretapping program.  One difference between these new cases and 
many of the cases that were decided in the 1960s and 70s—cases like 
Keith, NAACP v. Alabama, and Rumely—is that the new cases involve a 
program whose specific targets are unknown.  We know how the NSA 
program works, of course; the New York Times (and later the President) 
explained that the program involves the warrantless interception of e-
mails and telephone calls that originated or terminated inside the 
United States.  But we don’t know whose communications have been 
intercepted under the program because the government refuses to 
say.  The question before the courts is whether plaintiffs who are 
unable to show with certainty that their communications have been 
intercepted under the program can establish standing by 
demonstrating that the program has had a chilling effect on their 
First Amendment activity.  
 As some of you know, this question is a hotly contested one.  
Everyone agrees, of course, that a litigant can’t invoke the jurisdiction 
of a federal court without first showing that he or she has been 
injured by the government’s conduct.46  There is disagreement, 
though, about what should count as an injury in this context.  Some 
appellate courts have said that the only injury that counts is actual 
interception.  With something like the NSA program, however, a 
showing of actual interception is nearly impossible for plaintiffs to 
make.   
I’ve been litigating one of these NSA cases since early 2006.  After 
the President acknowledged the existence of the NSA program, we 
filed a lawsuit against the NSA on behalf of a coalition of journalists, 
researchers, and criminal defense attorneys.47  The plaintiffs were 
people whose work required them to engage in sensitive 
communications with witnesses, experts, clients, and sources located 
overseas.  The plaintiffs couldn’t show with certainty that their 
communications had been intercepted by the NSA, but they could 
show that the NSA program had inhibited them from engaging in 
constitutionally protected activity.  The journalists could show that 
the program had prevented them from gathering information from 
sources in Afghanistan and Iraq.  The lawyers could show that the 
 46. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“A federal court’s jurisdiction 
therefore can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered ‘some 
threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action . . . .’”) 
(citation omitted).  
 47. ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency/Central Sec. Serv., 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. 
Mich. 2006), vacated, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1334 (2008). 
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program had prevented them from gathering information from 
witnesses in Israel and Palestine.  Because they feared that their 
communications were being monitored by the NSA, some of the 
plaintiffs had traveled to the Middle East to gather information that 
they would otherwise have been able to gather over the telephone or 
by e-mail.  To our plaintiffs, the threat of surveillance was just as 
harmful as the surveillance itself; they had had to adjust their 
behavior to address the possibility that the government might be 
monitoring their calls.  We argued, relying in part on Keith, NAACP v. 
Alabama, and Rumely, that the harm that the NSA program had 
caused to our plaintiffs constituted an injury sufficient to establish 
standing. 
The district court agreed with us that we had established standing, 
and it held that the NSA’s program violated statutory law as well as 
the First and Fourth Amendments.  We fared less well, though, in the 
Sixth Circuit.  Two members of the panel found that our plaintiffs 
did not have standing to sue because they could not prove that their 
communications had been monitored by the NSA.  Those judges also 
held that the government could properly rely on the state secrets 
privilege to justify its refusal to disclose whether our plaintiffs had 
been monitored.  (The third member of the panel found that we had 
established standing and agreed with the district court that the NSA 
program was unlawful.)        
 Needless to say, I think the Sixth Circuit majority got it wrong.  For 
one thing, the consequence of the rule adopted by the Sixth Circuit 
is that the government can insulate its surveillance programs from 
judicial scrutiny simply by refusing to disclose who its surveillance 
targets have been.  The Sixth Circuit’s rule is also inconsistent with a 
key insight of cases like Keith, NAACP v. Alabama, and Rumely—that 
the harm to First Amendment rights flows not just from surveillance 
itself but from the threat of surveillance.  The First Amendment 
implications are the same, maybe even more severe, when there’s 
uncertainty about who the government is monitoring.   
 To say that the only people who can challenge government’s 
surveillance are those who can prove they were actually monitored is 
to ignore the corrosive effect that the mere threat of surveillance can 
have on First Amendment rights.  It is not true that the only people 
injured by government surveillance programs are those who can 
prove they were targeted individually.  Unchecked government 
surveillance has a broader chilling effect, as the Supreme Court has 
recognized.  If the freedoms of speech, association, and religion are 
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to be preserved, I think it’s critical that this broader effect not be 
ignored or underestimated by the lower courts.  
V. PANEL:  SECRECY AND BARRIERS TO OPEN GOVERNMENT 
A. Glenn M. Sulmasy∗
The United States’ response to 9/11 presents unique challenges to 
maintaining the ever-delicate balance between a citizen’s right to 
know and a government’s right to conduct its affairs in the most 
efficient and expeditious manner possible.  The current debate on 
this issue is incredibly polarized, and can generally be broken down 
into two camps:  those who view the conflict as a “Global War on 
Terror” requiring greater government secrecy; and those who see it 
as a law enforcement action subject to the normal obligations of 
openness and accountability.  In this Essay, I articulate a “third way” 
of viewing the current conflict, one that justifies greater government 
secrecy but in such a way that begins by acknowledging basic human 
rights and civil liberties. 
The current debates on balancing privacy and national security, 
and other debates associated with our current conflict, strongly 
diverge and become polarized depending upon the paradigm from 
which one views the current conflict:  whether the war against al 
Qaeda necessitates a law of war analysis or a law enforcement 
response.  In contrast with most of the panelists at the Symposium, I 
do view the current struggle as an armed conflict.  However, I view 
the armed conflict as, and only refer to it as, the “War on al Qaeda.”48  
It is truly not a war on terror. 
The phrase “Global War on Terror” is a confusing misnomer. 
Critically, we can never defeat terrorism, per se.  We are not fighting 
the IRA, the Red Brigades, the Shining Path, or Hamas.  Rather, our 
struggle is focused on a single terrorist network, an identifiable 
enemy, al Qaeda. 
 ∗  Glenn M. Sulmasy is on the law faculty of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and 
is a national security and human rights fellow at Harvard University.  This essay was 
developed from a speech he delivered as part of the Symposium, “Left Out in the 
Cold?  The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the Press in Post-9/11 America,” 
sponsored by the Washington College of Law and the American Civil Liberties Union 
in September 2007.  The views expressed herein are his own and should not in any 
way be construed as the views of the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. 
Coast Guard, or the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. 
 48. See generally Glenn Sulmasy, The War on al Qaeda, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 20, 2007, 
at B7 (arguing that the United States should realign its mission and focus by re-
labeling the “war on terror” as the “war against al Qaeda”). 
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The “war on terror” label has led many scholars, practitioners, and 
policy makers to be justifiably suspicious of the Administration’s 
motives.  Because of the ambiguous and broad title, many have 
legitimately questioned whether it is the Administration’s intent to 
call the conflict a “Global War on Terror” to extraordinarily increase 
executive power.49  Some critics also claim that this conflict was 
labeled a war to unnecessarily, arbitrarily, or even illegally keep 
secrets from the citizenry.  I truly do not believe that is the case, but I 
can understand how these criticisms emerge. 
The title we give to the current conflict matters a great deal.  It 
impacts strategy, tactics, and the laws used to govern the conflict.  A 
war without end should give pause to all of us—most importantly to 
those who have committed to serving in the armed forces of the 
United States.  In addition, unlimited periods of war or national 
emergency are normally associated with curtailing of civil liberties 
and creating the environment for potential abuse of power and the 
opportunity for a government to commit myriad human rights 
violations.  Thus, the need for long-term government secrecy, as part 
of a permanent war on terror, seems contrary to traditional American 
values. 
The name “Global War on Terror” sounds an awful lot like former 
President Lyndon Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” and the President 
Reagan/Bush “War on Drugs.”  Without question, these are noble, 
national ambitions but they are not armed conflicts.  Critics have 
used this similarity to argue that, like the “wars” on poverty and 
drugs, the “Global War on Terror” is nothing more than a title given 
to show the level of national effort and resource commitment to the 
struggle.  Because these “efforts” have not triggered the employment 
of a law of war legal regime, neither should the current conflict with 
al Qaeda. 
However, these previous national campaigns were not armed 
conflicts.  The current struggle against international terrorism is 
clearly some form of armed conflict.  In reality, it a mixture of 
traditional warfare and law enforcement—it is a hybrid armed 
 49. Various academics, members of the media, and critics of the Administration 
have asserted many of the decisions made by the Bush Administration have been part 
of an orchestrated effort to enhance executive power—and implement the idea of 
the “Unitary Executive.”  See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, George W. Bush and the Nature of 
Executive Authority:  The Role of Courts in a Time of Constitutional Change, 72 BROOK. L. 
REV. 871, 872–73 (2007) (discussing President Bush’s assertions of broad executive 
power); Dana Milbank, In Cheney’s Shadow, Counsel Pushes the Conservative Cause, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2004, at A21 (remarking that notions of the unitary executive 
theory can be found in the White House memorandum justifying torture of 
terrorism suspects). 
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conflict.  Every day, our men and women in uniform are fighting on 
numerous fronts against an enemy who has declared war on the 
United States.  The American response to the 9/11 attacks by al 
Qaeda have utilized the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the 
National Security Agency (“NSA”), and the Central Intelligence 
Agency (“CIA”) in greater prominence than ever before. 
Thus, by calling the current conflict the “War on al Qaeda,” we can 
give a face to our enemy and create a framework for victory.  It helps 
ensure this will be a finite war with a decreased likelihood of abuse of 
power.  This conflict label also provides a more workable framework 
for justifying secrecy in many areas of governmental activity when 
fighting al Qaeda and international terrorism—distinct from strictly 
domestic law enforcement operations. 
Having declared that we are engaged in an armed conflict, we now 
turn to the other side of the equation and determine what universally 
accepted human rights are impacted by secrecy during wartime.  As 
we approach the anniversary of that wonderful, aspirational 
document, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights50 (“UDHR” 
or “Declaration”), the United States and the West currently struggle 
to promote peace and national security while still supporting the 
notions of human rights within the world community.  Adopted on 
December 10, 1948, well ahead of its time, the Declaration asserted 
various commonly understood human rights.51
Specifically at issue at our Symposium is the citizens’ “right to 
know,” which is largely extrapolated from the second clause of Article 
1952 and Article 2153 of the Declaration.  Clearly, it is a vital and 
universally accepted principle that a government should operate in 
the open and not in secrecy.  It is a universally recognized human 
right for citizens to be able to fully participate in their government.  
Many will construe this, if not covered separately in treaties they are 
parties to, as having become customary international law. 
This right, however, is appropriately cast against the legitimate 
needs of the government to act without public comment or 
participation during times of armed conflict or emergency.  It is a 
 50. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 51. See, e.g., id. art. 3–5 (stating rights to life, liberty, and security of person while 
proscribing persons from being subjected slavery or inhuman treatment or 
punishment). 
 52. See id. art. 19, cl. 2 (“[The right to freedom of opinions and expression] 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive[,] and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”). 
 53. See id. art. 21 (providing for the right to take part in the government of one’s 
country and the right to equal access to public service in one’s country). 
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delicate balancing test.  In peacetime, the public’s right to know what 
their government is doing is essential and has been an integral part 
of the American way of governing since our founding in the 
eighteenth century.  During times of war, however, the scales tip in 
favor of the government. 
Many today suggest that the scales have tipped too far in favor of 
the government,54 but history reveals similar patterns.  Even in the 
post-Second World War era (post-UDHR), the U.S. government, 
regardless of party affiliation, maintained a strong pro-secrecy stance.  
In wartime, secrecy is critical to mission success.  It has always been 
that way and will continue to be that way into the foreseeable future.  
Once a nation commits to go to war—any war—it is empirically true 
that the government waging war will seek heightened levels of 
secrecy.  Thus, if the war on al Qaeda is an armed conflict, the 
balance (as has historically been the case) shifts to the government 
for the duration of the conflict. 
An acceptance of greater government secrecy is a tacit part of the 
decision making when any democratic nation commits to engage in 
armed conflict.  The great warrior Sun Tzu wrote, “what enables the 
wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and 
achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is 
foreknowledge.”55  It has certainly been that way throughout 
American history.  From the American Revolution, to our Civil War, 
to the Second World War, to the invasion of Grenada, and through 
our current armed conflict, we have never been naïve:  We have 
always entered these wars knowing that increased secrecy would be a 
critical element for our success. 
 Even the great liberal champion of human rights and the 
founder most supportive of the dignity of humanity, Thomas 
Jefferson, understood the need for secrecy in general (and 
particularly in wartime).  Actually, Jefferson was concerned about 
sharing the secrets of the executive with Congress—let alone the 
 54.  Oversight Hearing on Reform of the State Secrets Privilege Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 
(Jan. 29, 2008) (statement of H. Thomas Wells, Jr., President-Elect, American Bar 
Association) (“More searching judicial review, informed by evidence, would ensure 
that government assertions of necessity are truly warranted and not simply a means 
to avoid embarrassment or accountability.”).  Also, look to the recent debate and 
congressional hearings on the necessity of classifying the OLC 2003 memo stating 
that criminal laws would not apply to interrogators if they acted to “prevent further 
attacks.”  Recent testimony on this issue can be found in the April 30 Hearing before 
the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property 
Rights. 
 55. SUN TZU, ON THE ART OF WAR 59 (Lionel Giles trans., Allandale Online 
Publishing 2000) (1910). 
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media and general public.56  This need for governmental secrecy was 
even more pressing for Jefferson when it related to intelligence 
gathering. 
Ben Franklin expressed similar sentiments in 1776.  While leading 
the Committee of Secret Correspondence for the Continental 
Congress, Franklin asserted the unanimous opinion of the 
Committee that they could not share sensitive secrets about a French 
covert operation to assist the Revolution because “[w]e find by fatal 
experience Congress consists of too many members to keep secrets.”57  
This sounds awfully familiar, no? 
Thus, the founders, as well as many modern administrations in 
both the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, have strongly insisted 
that the media, the citizenry, and even Congress are presumptively 
not privy to most wartime secrets and intelligence activities.  The 
situation should be no different in this War against al Qaeda.  In 
many respects, certainly tactically and strategically, secrecy may be 
perhaps even more important.  This need for secrecy is even more 
pressing given the twenty-four-hour media coverage that is now an 
integral part of society.  The key remains, however, to not abuse such 
discretion and ensure the public remains aware of the myriad secret 
operations as soon as practicable without impeding mission 
accomplishment or compromising legitimate intelligence collection.  
Thus, such “secrecy” is critical; the burden remains on the executive 
branch to be ever mindful of its obligations to be open and 
transparent with the electorate as soon as hostilities cease or when 
practicable and reasonable. 
As explained in Part II, the conflict with al Qaeda that began on 
September 11, 2001 defies traditional classification.  The al Qaeda 
fighter does not fit comfortably into either category of criminal or of 
warrior; he is truly a mix.  Additionally, we are fighting this battle with 
a combination of law enforcement and warfare techniques.58  
Determining the appropriate balance between the government’s 
 56. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, Opinion on the Powers of the Senate (Apr. 24, 1790), in 
THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA (John P. Foley ed., 1900) (“The Senate is not supposed 
by the Constitution to be acquainted with the concerns of the Executive Department.  
It was not intended that these should be communicated to them.”). 
 57. Wartime Executive Power and the NSA’s Surveillance Authority II:  Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 15 (2006) (testimony of Robert F. Turner, 
Associate Director, Center for National Security Law, University of Virginia) (quoting 
Franklin). 
 58. See generally Glenn M. Sulmasy, The Legal Landscape After Hamdan:  The 
Creation of Homeland Security Courts, 13 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2006) (arguing 
for the adoption of homeland security courts that would function as a hybrid of 
military commissions and Article III federal courts). 
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need for secrecy and the citizen’s right to know therefore requires 
recognition of the hybrid nature of the conflict. 
This armed conflict, by its asymmetric nature, is one where 
intelligence gathering is a major part of military operations.  Even 
more so than in past conflicts, aggressive intelligence collection is 
critical in this struggle.  Thus, the government through its various 
agencies involved in fighting this war (the Department of Justice, 
Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency) needs 
secrecy more than ever in order to best protect the homeland.  The 
normal Western and U.S. standards for open government and 
discussion on the means and methods of such warfare would be 
dangerous for our men and women in uniform and likely ensure 
defeat at the hands of the al Qaeda fighters. 
Therefore, I would suggest that the need for governmental secrecy 
in the War on al Qaeda is, by its very nature, greater than before, 
since we have no nation state to negotiate with, no traditional means 
of waging war—e.g., troop movements, massive invasions, toppling a 
government, etc.  Preventing attacks from al Qaeda before they occur 
is the key to success in this conflict.59  Open dialogue on intelligence 
collection and the means and methods employed by our intelligence 
professionals would be disastrous for our men and women fighting in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as for those protecting the homeland. 
Democracies are, and should be, uncomfortable with governmental 
secrecy.  The United States has traditionally been a nation suspicious 
of governmental activity.  That is the nature of the American psyche.  
However, in times of war or armed conflict—such as the current 
armed conflict with al Qaeda—it remains critical that the government 
retains the right to certain levels of secrecy while fighting an enemy.  
Thus, although not absolute by any means, the balance between 
openness and secrecy necessarily tips toward the government—
especially in this unique twenty-first century war. 
B. Erwin Chemerinsky∗
Thank you.  It is an honor and a pleasure to be here.  The Bush 
Administration has been more obsessed with and has invoked more 
 59.  Cf. Richard A. Posner, A New Surveillance Act, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2006, at 
A16 (“National security intelligence is a search for the needle in a haystack.  The 
intelligence services must cast a wide net with a fine mesh to catch the clues that may 
enable the next attack to be prevented.”). 
 ∗  Alston & Bird Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Duke 
University School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1978; B.S., Northwestern University, 
1975. 
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efforts at secrecy than any presidency since Richard Nixon.  This has 
taken many different forms.  For example, not long after 9/11, the 
Bush Administration, through a memo by the Chief Immigration 
Judge, Michael Creppy, imposed blanket closure of all immigration 
proceedings of those who were accused of any terrorist activity.60
Additionally, what has not had nearly as much publicity was the 
attempt by the Bush Administration and the Justice Department to 
hold secret trials and proceedings in federal district courts and even 
appellate proceedings in the federal court of appeals.  These matters 
did not appear on any docket.  At the Spring 2002 annual conference 
of federal defenders, a federal defender said, “I cannot tell you very 
much about this, but in our district we have an entirely secret file 
going on against somebody that does not appear on any docket at 
all.”  The next year he said, “[I]t is now in the Eleventh Circuit and it 
does not appear on any docket sheet.”  I started hearing about these 
types of proceedings from other people.  Eventually, a letter of 
inquiry was sent to then Chief Judge of the Southern District of New 
York, Judge Mukasey, by the Legal Director of the ACLU, Stephen 
Shapiro.  Judge Mukasey responded by saying, “Unfortunately, or 
should I say fortunately, I cannot tell you anything about this.” 
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press found dozens 
of instances of entirely secret proceedings that did not appear on any 
docket in the federal district court here in the District of Columbia 
alone.  Additionally, there have been changes of policies with regard 
to the Freedom of Information Act,61 and things that were previously 
open to the public are no longer being made public. 
One part of this secrecy piece is executive privilege.  I want to talk 
about a couple of things with regard to executive privilege.  First, I 
will talk about the general law regarding executive privilege.  Second, 
I will discuss how this Administration has used executive privilege.  
Regarding the law of executive privilege, it might surprise you to 
know, there have only been two Supreme Court cases in history that 
have dealt with executive privilege in any detail.  The first, and 
unquestionably the most important, was United States v. Nixon62 in 
1974.  Leon Jaworski, Special Prosecutor during the Watergate 
Scandal, subpoenaed tapes of White House conversations to use in 
the prosecution of those who had been involved in the Watergate 
 60. Memorandum from Michael Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to All 
Immigration Judges and Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2001), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf. 
 61. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2008). 
 62. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
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cover-up.  President Nixon invoked executive privilege in an effort to 
keep the tapes secret.  District court Judge John Sirica ruled against 
the President, and the case then went to the United States court of 
appeals.  Before the court of appeals could issue a decision, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and took up the case. 
The Brethren:  Inside the Supreme Court,63 by Woodward and 
Armstrong, is a fascinating story about how the opinion was drafted.  
It tells the story of how then Chief Justice Burger assigned himself to 
write the opinion, and when the other Justices saw his opinion they 
determined that it would not receive a passing grade in law school, so 
they met secretly and parceled out writing the opinion amongst 
themselves.  Justice White had the task of writing the part on grand-
jury proceedings, and he wrote a memo to the other Justices 
indicating that Chief Justice Burger wrote a great opinion except for 
the part about the grand jury and, therefore, he would substitute it.  
It is for this reason that the decision does not read like it was written 
by one person.  In a vote of eight to zero, the Supreme Court ruled 
against the President; Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the 
decision because he had been an Assistant Attorney General in the 
Nixon Justice Department. 
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Nixon, determined that 
Presidents have executive privilege and that executive privilege is 
important because it preserves the confidentiality that is necessary for 
candid discussion and advice to the President, especially when 
matters of foreign policy are involved.  However, the Supreme Court 
determined that executive privilege is not absolute.  It has to yield 
when there is an overriding need for information, such as when the 
need for evidence in a criminal trial outweighs executive privilege.  
The Court would not allow President Nixon to have executive 
privilege here and keep the federal courts from receiving the 
evidence necessary to provide due process and fair trials for those 
involved in the Watergate cover-up.  It decided that the President 
cannot invoke executive privilege in a manner that keeps another 
branch from fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities.  As a result, 
Nixon was ordered to produce the tapes.  One of the tapes had a very 
famous conversation where President Nixon said he would tell the 
FBI not to investigate the Watergate break-in because it was a CIA 
matter.  That, by any definition, is obstruction of justice.  When that 
came out, Republicans in Congress and Nixon supporters told the 
 63. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN:  INSIDE THE SUPREME 
COURT (Simon & Schuster 2005) (1979). 
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President that he could not go forward, and Nixon announced his 
resignation. 
The only other major Supreme Court case dealing with executive 
privilege is Cheney v. United States District Court,64 involving the energy 
policy study group.  The case is unusual because of the strange 
procedural posture in which it came to the Supreme Court.  It was 
sufficiently unusual that it is fair to say that pretty much all that is 
discussed about executive privilege is dicta in that opinion.  But 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court did recognize that there is 
executive privilege.  He drew a distinction between the need for 
evidence in criminal cases and civil proceedings.  He said that the 
need for evidence in criminal cases was more compelling than in civil 
cases, where perhaps more deference is given to the President’s 
executive privilege. 
Given that background, I can spend a few minutes talking about 
how the Bush Administration has used executive privilege.  It has 
already been alluded to that the Administration did not want the 
9/11 Commission to start with, but when it was finally created, they 
used executive privilege.  The current controversy regarding the Bush 
Administration’s use of executive privilege is the refusal of Harriet 
Miers and Joshua Bolten to testify.  I thought about whether it would 
be appropriate, in the context of this conference about civil liberties 
and the War on Terrorism, to discuss this issue, but I do think it gives 
a sense of the doctrine of executive privilege, and it is typical of many 
of the issues with regard to executive privilege that come up in all 
contexts. 
There has been an attempt by both the House and the Senate 
Judiciary Committees to investigate the firing of the United States 
Attorneys across the country.  The claim is that United States 
Attorneys were fired because they were launching investigations that 
the Administration wanted to stop or that they refused to initiate 
investigations for partisan political reasons.  The Administration has 
invoked executive privilege to keep Harriet Miers and Joshua Bolten 
from testifying.  I would suggest that this is a particularly weak case 
for executive privilege and a very strong case for congressional access 
to the information.  We can use this example to get a better sense of 
what executive privilege is all about. 
Let me give you several reasons why this is a weak case for executive 
privilege.  First, it is not clear that executive privilege applies here at 
all.  Both the Nixon and Cheney cases discussed executive privilege as a 
 64. 542 U.S. 367 (2004). 
  
1238 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1203 
                                                          
protection of confidential communications with the President or Vice 
President.  President Bush has said he had no involvement 
whatsoever in the firing of the United States Attorneys.  A D.C. 
Circuit case65 that involved an investigation of Mike Espy stated that if 
there is communication that goes on in anticipation of discussions 
with the President then that could also be protected, but in the case 
of Miers and Bolten there is no reason to believe that these 
communications would ultimately be discussed with the President.  
And no Supreme Court case or D.C. Circuit case has ever recognized 
that executive privilege could be applied to communications that 
were not even anticipated to be with the President. 
Second, there are technical requirements for the invocation of 
executive privilege that have not been met.  For example, there are 
D.C. Circuit cases that say that privilege logs need to be turned over, 
even if the privileged information itself is not.66  The Administration 
has refused to even provide those privilege logs.  There is some 
authority that says it needs to be the President who invokes executive 
privilege.  The President has not done so here.  In the past, when a 
witness before Congress has invoked executive privilege, he or she 
has personally appeared.  Harriet Miers did not even appear before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, notwithstanding the subpoena. 
Third, the Executive Branch’s need for secrecy here is minimal.  
The need for Executive Branch secrecy is greatest when foreign 
policy and national security issues are implicated.  In United States v. 
Nixon, the Supreme Court stressed that foreign policy and national 
security were not involved, and similarly there is no reason to believe 
that the firing of the United States Attorneys touches on matters of 
foreign policy or national security, nor that it would chill future 
communications with the President. 
Finally, I think the need for congressional information is great.  
The problem arose because an obscure provision in the Patriot Act 
renewal gave new authority to the Department of Justice to appoint 
interim attorneys (for the remainder of the Bush Administration) 
without approval by the Senate.67  Although Congress did change the 
law, Congress needs to decide what the appropriate statutory 
provision is, and in order to perform its legislative function, full 
information is important.  There are Supreme Court cases going back 
 65. In re Espy, 346 F.3d 199 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 66. See, e.g., In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg. Rm No. 2113, 497 
F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3528 (2008).   
 67. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (codified in scattered title numbers and sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
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to at least the early twentieth century, which state that there is a need 
for Congress to be able to conduct oversight investigations.  United 
States v. Nixon stood for the proposition that a President cannot 
invoke executive privilege in a way that keeps another branch from 
performing its core functions.  Here, the Administration does exactly 
that. 
Interestingly, if President Nixon had invoked executive privilege in 
the same way that the Bush Administration has, then there would 
have never been the successful hearings held by Senator Sam Ervin in 
the Watergate Senate Select Committee in 1973.  President Nixon 
initially invoked executive privilege because if White House Counsel, 
John Dean, was not able to speak then Alexander Butterfield, the 
aide who revealed the taping system, would not be able to speak.  
However, ultimately the Nixon Administration allowed its officials to 
testify.  The irony in the current situation is that the Bush 
Administration has said they would allow Miers and Bolten to testify, 
but only in closed sessions with no report made and not under oath.  
That very allowance undercuts any claim of a need of secrecy.  Unlike 
the perspective rendered by Commander Glenn Sulmasy, the 
Constitution puts the presumption on the side of openness and not 
secrecy, even in wartime.  Not absolute openness, of course, some 
things need to be held secret, but there is a balance.  I would like to 
conclude with the words of James Madison, who said, “Knowledge will 
forever govern ignorance and a people who mean to be their own 
governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge 
gives.”68  And, “[a] popular government, without popular information 
or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce, or a tragedy, 
or perhaps both.”69
C. David M. Hardy∗
Good morning.  I want to thank American University, the law 
school, the American University Law Review, and particularly the ACLU 
for inviting me here today.  I am going to talk about the FBI’s policy 
of processing Freedom of Information Act70 (“FOIA”) and Privacy 
 68. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/madison_papers/index.html (search 
“Search this collection” for “W.T. Barry;” follow “James Madison to W.T. Barry, 
August 4, 1822” hyperlink). 
 69. Id. 
 ∗  Chief, Records/Information Dissemination Section, Records Management 
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
 70. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2008). 
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Act71 requests.  These Acts provide the framework for one of the 
precepts of an open government—access to agency records.  The 
statute is a balance between complete disclosure of agency records 
and recognizing agency equities.  Agency equities are those things 
that, from the agency’s perspective, are necessary to not disclose to 
the public in order to accomplish the agency’s mission.  The FBI’s 
policy, as an intelligence and law enforcement agency, regarding 
what can be withheld and released is divided into two basic areas.  
The first area is the bureau’s determination on the use of 
exemptions, based largely on the interest of the agency.  This is 
probably the closest to a policy formulation process.  The second is 
the reality of processing FOIA requests, which can actually impact 
what the requester receives or agency responsiveness to requests.  
This second point is a pragmatic, rather than academic, endeavor, 
but it does affect what information the agency is able to provide. 
Regarding FBI policy, it is common sense what information the FBI 
deems important to protect from release.  For example, information 
necessary to protect national security, sensitive information, 
information about ongoing investigations, information that would 
allow individuals to circumvent investigations, sensitive techniques, 
identification of law enforcement officers, and privacy of third 
parties—all are strong FBI equities.  We feel strongly about ensuring 
that we protect this information before it is released.  We, of course, 
use all the other FOIA exemptions that are written into the statute, as 
well as those categories of information protected by other statutes. 
How does the agency find this balance?  Well, we first use the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Freedom of Information Act 
Guide72—the lavender book—that provides a summary of the case law 
from DOJ’s perspective.  It used to be the orange book, which was 
easy to describe, but I’m not sure what we call it now.  If you are a 
FOIA practitioner, it is the equivalent of your red book of Mao 
sayings.  Although the FBI uses the guide, there are also at any given 
time about one hundred cases in federal court involving the FBI, and 
that precedent is followed as it is decided.  The courts are 
instrumental in drawing the balance between the interests of agency 
and requester as to where the FBI sets the redaction standard. 
This is a fairly settled area of law, which provides one of the 
keystones from which the agency and the requester can predict to a 
certain degree what is going to occur in any given situation.  
 71. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). 
 72. OFFICE OF INFO. & PRIVACY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 
ACT GUIDE (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia_guide07.htm. 
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Occasionally, a judge will use equitable principles when making a 
decision, then at some point either the judge or his law clerk will 
actually read the statute and the case law and usually make a 
reconsideration in the FBI’s favor.  Of course certain circuits are 
always exciting, it is unclear where they are going to go, but on the 
whole it is a settled area. 
Most of the time when the FBI is spanked in a court opinion, it is 
because the FBI did not fully explain the rationale for the redactions.  
Since I am one of the authors working on the declarations, I have to 
take one of the hits in those areas.  From the FBI’s perspective, it is a 
little bit like having to go into overtime at a football game.  It was not 
won within the official time, but there is another chance to re-write it, 
and the FBI will go ahead and put in more focused effort and do 
what the judge said in order to prevail at that point.  The foundation 
of success in our declarations is all predicated upon being able to 
describe a particular harm. 
The process is equally pragmatic within the FBI.  Within the 
agency, the FBI discusses the possible harm with our operational 
divisions because the harm has to be articulable and not speculative.  
The operational people review the information and with their 
assistance, by looking at the case law, and looking at the subject 
matter involved, the FBI will use an exemption for particular 
information. 
The side that people never really seem to grasp is the influence of 
processing factors in FOIA litigation and FOIA appeals.  Many think 
that the FBI does not look deeply enough within the records for 
information and that it operates too slowly.  Actually, there is truth to 
the statement that the FBI is too slow, but that will be discussed 
below.  Although one can discuss theory or basic concepts, the 
bottom line is that there are three factors affecting the processing 
policy.  The first is the reality of resources.  The second is a constant 
need to balance speed versus accuracy, and the third, is the laws of 
physics. 
The resource issue is fairly clear, and will not be elaborated upon.  
Obviously, agencies have to balance the amount of resources they put 
into the Freedom of Information Act program with what they need to 
accomplish their mission; it is a closed environment.  If one hundred 
FOIA analysts are added, that results in the removal of fifty or sixty 
counterintelligence analysts.  Therefore, agencies have to make a 
balancing decision regarding that issue.  Regarding the second 
element, the FBI devotes a considerable number of people, over two 
hundred, to Freedom of Information Act work.  However, the 
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number of incoming requests is huge.  The agency receives an 
average of 1,500 requests per month, and while about 400 actually 
generate real records, all 1,500 have to be searched.  These requests 
can vary from twenty to thirty to tens of thousands per year.  As a 
result, it is somewhat like standing underneath the waterfall as these 
requests come in, and it is a constant push.  There is enormous 
pressure, both from the exterior, from the Department of Justice, 
from Congress, and from the general public, to process these 
requests as quickly as possible. 
The FBI puts great emphasis on responding to these requests.  The 
way to tell what a bureaucracy is going to deem important is by 
looking at the bottom line, whether performance in a particular area 
is part of management’s performance assessment.  As someone who is 
in charge of the Freedom of Information Act processing, my 
performance evaluation and whether or not I will ever get a bonus, is 
based in part on my ability to improve the speed at which requests are 
processed.  However, speed presents its own problems because when 
you try to push things through, accuracy can suffer.  If the individual 
requester wants a thorough and exhaustive search in every possible 
drawer, every possible computer system for anything that remotely 
mentions them, this is impossible considering the FBI receives 1,500 
requests per month.  If the FBI were to search everything in response 
to each request, the agency would grind to a halt. 
Therefore, the FBI makes policies in order to address this 
balancing act.  One of the most litigated issues is the search for main 
files.  When the FBI receives a request, they search the main files and 
central indices to see if the individual is in a main file.  An individual 
may not have a main file but could be named in other FBI records.  
But the process of determining whether or not it is in fact that same 
individual in another FBI file is very time-consuming.  Essentially the 
file has to be pulled, put into context, for example, to see if it is 
possible that the individual might have lived in Iowa.  It takes time.  
Therefore, the FBI is always balancing time, how fast it can provide 
the information, against providing the major records of an individual.  
It is a balancing act that is stated on the FBI webpage. 
A main file is opened when an investigation is opened on an 
individual.  Therefore, when an individual sends in a request stating 
that:  On December 3, I was arrested at O’Hare Airport because I had 
something leaking from my suitcase that alerted people and the FBI 
interviewed me, there will not be a main file on the individual, which 
means that the FBI never opened an investigation about them.  
However, that individual will be in the FBI files and if specific 
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information is given in the request, it can be found.  On the other 
hand, a request for “everything that is on me” or “everything about an 
organization and all the cross-references” is a horrendous request. 
The third element, the law of physics, relates to the pure reality of 
the task.  The FBI has over one hundred million files and well over a 
billion pages, in 265 locations.  Even with automated indices for 
everything that occurred after 1995 and manual indices for what 
occurred before then, it takes time.  That is the law of physics.  There 
is no way to make such comprehensive searches and maintain the 
volume of requests that come in.  Another way to look at it is that 
either some people are going to be very rich and everyone else is 
going to be in complete poverty or the agency can try to spread the 
wealth around, which is the approach taken.  This pragmatic 
viewpoint is the most litigated and affects what information is 
available. 
The cure would be for all of the federal agencies to make their 
records electronic and for the FBI to develop a central repository 
where all records from the 265 locations can be brought in and put 
into electronic format.  The bottom-line is that if the goal is for 
greater freedom of information from agencies, there needs to be a 
push toward more up-to-date record keeping.  It is very expensive, 
but it would significantly impact the agency’s ability to find the 
records.  If there were time and the capacity to identify the 
individual, the FBI would provide every reference to the person, but 
the reality is that it has neither.  Ultimately, when a judge pins the 
agency down in litigation, the FBI will go do it.  That does not mean 
go out and litigate, please.  (Laughter)  The ACLU provides the FBI 
with a good amount.  (Laughter)  But that is the reality, and that 
balancing act is the key ingredient of the FBI’s policy toward 
responding to information requests. 
VI. PANEL:  THE ROLE OF WHISTLEBLOWERS TO FACILITATE 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 
A. Valerie Caproni∗
Good morning, everyone.  As a current FBI employee, I will talk 
about whistleblowing from the agency’s perspective.  Panels like this 
are best when there is a point—counterpoint.  “There absolutely 
 ∗  General Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation; J.D., University of Georgia School of Law, 1979; B.A., Newcomb College of 
Tulane University, 1976. 
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should be a shield law because it is essential to the First Amendment” 
versus “A shield law is a terrible idea.”  “The President’s Terrorist 
Surveillance Program is a gross invasion of American’s institutional 
rights.” versus “TSP is an incredibly important program that keeps 
the country safe.”  I regret to say that on this issue, we will not have 
disagreement along those lines. In principle, whistleblowers serve a 
useful function in government, and the FBI agrees wholeheartedly 
that people who in good faith raise issues and concerns should not be 
retaliated against.  Criminal conduct, waste, fraud and abuse are not 
in the FBI’s best interest, and to the extent such conduct occurs, 
management needs to know about it. 
Although there is no constitutional protection for a whistleblower, 
there is a fairly robust regulatory scheme to protect whistleblowers 
within the FBI.  The scheme is designed to make sure that 
whistleblowers are not retaliated against and to get the information 
outside of the FBI to the extent an employee believes they are being 
retaliated against.  The basic statutory scheme prohibits personnel 
reprisals against anyone for making a protected disclosure.73  It 
requires the Attorney General (“AG”) to issue regulations ensuring 
that such adverse personnel actions will not happen.  In fact, the AG 
has issued regulations, and they appear in the Code of Federal 
Regulations.74  The scheme that exists for the FBI is very similar to 
that which exists for non-intelligence community agencies.  One 
difference is that whistleblower complaints are considered by the 
Office of Attorney Recruitment and Management (“OARM”) rather 
than by the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”), which is the 
federal government agency that protects civil service employees from 
adverse personnel actions.  OARM, by regulation, is the entity within 
the Department of Justice that considers claims of reprisal for the 
FBI. 
What is protected?  An employee can make a protected disclosure, 
and therefore, receive protection from reprisal if he or she 
reasonably believes there was a violation of a rule, law or regulation, 
mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or some 
substantial and specific danger to public health and safety.  Although 
the regulations appear to include a very limited number of people to 
whom a protected disclosure can be made, the number is actually 
fairly large.  A protected disclosure can be made to the DOJ, Office of 
Professional Responsibility (“OPR”), the DOJ Inspector General 
 73. 5 U.S.C. § 2303 (2000). 
 74. 28 C.F.R. § 27 (2008). 
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(“IG”), the Attorney General, or the Deputy Attorney General, or you 
can go to the FBI Director or the FBI Deputy Director. 
For those who do not know the structure of the FBI, within the 
agency there is only one political appointee—the Director.  The 
Deputy Director is a career employee who has risen to the rank of 
second in command at the FBI.  A whistleblower can go to FBI OPR, 
which is headed by a career employee and is responsible for 
discipline within the FBI, to the Special Agent in Charge (“SAC”) of 
any field office, or the highest-ranking person within the field office.  
Any of those officials can accept a protected disclosure.  This 
regulatory scheme is created to protect a disclosure because 
allegations of criminal conduct, fraud, waste or abuse, or substantial 
danger to public safety are serious. 
The regulation is designed so that such disclosures can be made at 
a level high enough within the organization that something will be 
done about it, but the disclosure should stay within the department.  
To that end, disclosures made to the press or to Congress, with one 
exception, are not protected disclosures.  For those who do not think 
this is right, think about it in the following manner:  the goal of 
whistleblowing is for the agency to do something about the 
allegations and get the government agency back in line to do what it 
is they are supposed to do.  A scheme that would allow an FBI 
employee to go public and talk to the press about anything that he or 
she knows or has some concern about poses very substantial risks to 
national security and the confidentiality of law enforcement activities. 
These risks are magnified by the fact that all FBI employees have 
top-secret clearances.  They are privy to some of the nation’s most 
sensitive secrets.  They are also privy to a lot of confidential 
information.  In Mike German’s introduction, the speaker noted that 
he was an undercover agent.  When he was working undercover, that 
was an incredibly sensitive fact that could have gotten him or other 
people killed.  However, some employee could decide that he does 
not like the fact that Mike German is undercover against X domestic 
group and disclose it to the press as a whistleblower.  Such an action 
could put Mike in extreme danger.  Danger to our employees is one 
of several very practical reasons why whistleblowers should stay within 
the organization and bring their concerns to a high level official, so 
that appropriate action can be taken. 
Even if an employee thinks, for instance, that their own SAC is 
complicit in the criminality, there are enough different places for 
them to go.  They can go to an IG or to the Department of Justice.  
There are enough options that no employee should feel that he or 
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she is in the position of knowing horrible secrets of criminality and 
have no place to turn.  Although there may be issues with the 
Department of State’s IG, no one has ever suggested that the 
Department of Justice’s IG is anything but a vigorous advocate for 
doing what is right.  You have to make the disclosure to the right 
person, but there is a fairly broad range of people to whom you can 
make it. 
Once an individual makes a disclosure, there is a very detailed 
process that deals with claims of retaliation.  Any employee who 
believes that he or she has suffered adverse personnel action because 
of a protected disclosure can complain or make a claim of retaliation 
to either the Department’s OPR or the DOJ’s IG.  The IG and OPR 
work out between themselves who is going to investigate, and the 
agencies have an obligation to conduct an investigation to determine 
whether there are “reasonable grounds to believe that there has been 
or will be a reprisal.”75  If the agency (IG or OPR) does not believe 
there has been any reprisal, the complainant has to be informed and 
given an opportunity to persuade the agency that he or she has been 
retaliated against or is in danger of retaliation. 
Interestingly, the procedural rules are tilted toward the 
complainant, much like employment litigation, to make sure that 
there is no reprisal.  For example, if the IG or OPR concludes that 
there is no reasonable ground to believe there was reprisal, the 
government or the agency cannot use that finding in court unless the 
complainant agrees.  Therefore, the complainant can control how 
that information gets out or if it ever gets out.  On the other hand, if 
the IG or OPR finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe 
there was reprisal, it would report that together with their 
recommendation for corrective action to OARM.  It is then up to 
OARM to determine whether in fact there has been reprisal.  At this 
point, OARM becomes the adjudicative branch.  If OARM decides 
that the protected disclosure was a “contributing factor” in the 
personnel action that was at issue, corrective action will be ordered.  
The standard used for determining whether it was a contributing 
factor is incredibly low.  Specifically, OARM can conclude that a 
disclosure was a contributing factor if the person taking the 
personnel action knew about the protected disclosure, or if the 
personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a 
reasonable person would conclude that it was a contributing factor. 
 75. 28 C.F.R. § 27.3(f) (2008). 
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Therefore, if there is a disclosure, and an adverse personnel action 
is taken shortly after, there is essentially a presumption that it was 
reprisal.  Again, this is incredibly protective of the employee.  From 
the FBI’s perspective, there is a presumption that if it is close in time, 
it was a contributing factor.  The burden shifts at that point to the 
agency, and the FBI has to demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence, which is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but is a 
substantial amount of evidence, that we would have taken the same 
personnel action regardless of the protected disclosure.  At that point 
you have a decision by OARM, and either side can appeal to the 
Deputy Attorney General (“DAG”) if they disagree with the corrective 
action—either from the perspective of the FBI, which is ordered to 
do something that they disagree with, or from the employee’s 
perspective, if he or she thinks the corrective action is inadequate or 
the finding against the retaliation claim is in error. 
That is the basic scheme.  But there is one other pertinent statute 
relevant to intelligence community employees.  FBI employees also 
get the benefit of the Intelligence Community Whistleblowers 
Protection Act of 1998.76  Under that Act, an employee can bring an 
issue of “urgent concern” to the IG.  A matter of “urgent concern” is 
“[a] serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive 
Order, or deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or 
operations of an intelligence activity involving classified information, 
but does not include differences of opinions concerning public 
policy matters.”77  Interestingly, it also does not include false 
statements to Congress, which seems a little odd. 
If the IG finds the allegation to be credible, the IG is obligated to 
tell the Director, who is, in turn, required to tell Congress.  If the IG 
finds the allegation is not credible, then the employee can go directly 
to a member of Congress who is a House or Senate Intelligence 
Committee member.  If the employee chooses to contact a member 
of Congress, he or she must notify the Director of the FBI and follow 
the directions given relative to the classified information being 
disclosed.  The Director can impose certain security rules on the 
employee before he or she can go to Congress, but nonetheless the 
employee can get to Congress. 
The statutory scheme works pretty well.  The FBI does not receive a 
lot of claims of whistleblower reprisal.  As General Counsel, there are 
more claims that employees have been retaliated against for 
 76. 5 U.S.C. app. § 8H (Supp. II 2002). 
 77. Id. § 8H(h)(1). 
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exercising their rights under the EEOC claim system than because 
they are whistleblowers.  One concern about this system is that it can 
be abused.  For instance, OARM will still view an allegation by an 
employee as a protected disclosure if the employee goes first to a 
member of Congress and then the Congress brings it to our 
attention, instead of going to one of the employees or officials as 
provided in the statute or regulation.  From our perspective, that 
thwarts the statutory scheme because it prohibits us from taking 
initial corrective action.  Employees may presume that “management 
already knows this,” but some FBI managers manage an organization 
of 40,000 employees all over the world.  Lots of things occur in the 
FBI that I do not know as the General Counsel and certainly the 
Director does not know.  It is useful for us to learn these things from 
the employee first. 
Another question that often arises regarding whistleblowers is 
whether they are good or bad.  The answer is, sometimes they are 
good, and sometimes they are bad.  Sometimes they are just cranky 
employees that have decided that they know better than everybody 
else how something should be done and what should be done.  When 
such an employee makes national security information public 
because they disagree with the policy decisions, then the 
whistleblower is not a net benefit to the Bureau and is not a net 
benefit to you, the American people.  There is the DOJ, a Presidential 
appointee in charge of the FBI, and lots of extremely dedicated 
employees who are trying to do the right thing, and it is not 
beneficial to set up a scheme where that whole organization of very 
good, honorable people are held hostage to some nutty whistleblower 
who decides to go public with information that should never be made 
available to the public in the first place. 
VII. CONGRESSIONAL PANEL:  SETTING A POSITIVE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA 
FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A. Congressman Robert C. “Bobby” Scott∗
Thank you, Caroline for your very kind introduction.  When she 
said she was going to introduce me, I was a little bit nervous.  We give 
a lot of speeches and half the people that introduce us do not know 
us.  (Laughter)  They are confined to the script that we give them, so 
we can be comforted that we are going to get a nice introduction.  
 ∗  Congressman, Third Congressional District of Virginia 
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When someone knows you well, they can tell all the truth.  Thank 
you, Caroline for just telling the good stuff. 
Thank you to the ACLU for having this forum on the Constitution 
and First Amendment protections because there are a lot of 
controversies going on in Congress as we speak.  As we talk about 
protecting the Constitution, and about all that I have done to protect 
the Constitution, I am reminded of the old man that ended up at the 
Pearly Gates.  He, at a very young age, had survived the Johnstown 
Flood, and he always liked to tell the story about that flood.  As he got 
older and older, it occurred to him that there were fewer and fewer 
and fewer people around who could actually validate the facts.  And 
so he took advantage of that, and that flood (Laughter) grew, and 
grew, and grew, and he showed up at the Pearly Gates and he said, 
Saint Peter, I want to tell the story about the flood.  And Saint Peter 
said, yeah, yeah, yeah, we have been listening to this, and you have 
been boring everybody, but I will tell you what:  you can tell it once, 
and that’s it.  And the old man said, “Okay, okay.”  And so Saint Peter 
gathered everybody together to listen to this story and gave the old 
man a nice introduction, and then said, now, before you tell the story 
about the flood, remember that Noah is in the audience.  (Laughter)  
So, Caroline, thank you for all you have done for protecting the 
Constitution.  Thank you Nadine Strossen and Ron Smolla, who is 
from my part of Virginia.  All the experts and people who have really 
been defending the Constitution are here in the audience, and I am 
supposed to give a speech about protecting the Constitution. 
But I can talk about protecting the Constitution from a 
congressional perspective, because during the last few years, we have 
had a frontal assault on the Constitution, particularly with things like 
the Patriot Act (“Act”).78  The 9/11 attack gave some individuals an 
opportunity they have not had for a long time because now they 
could effectively use fear to get a lot of legislation passed.  The reason 
why the Patriot Act passed so quickly and why people could put it 
together so quickly was that it did not take any original thinking.  The 
drafters just reached up on the shelf, pulled out everything they had 
not been able to get passed for years, stapled it all together, and then 
put “Patriotism” as the title.  And all of the sudden, using fear, they 
were able to get this legislation passed. 
One of the most egregious parts of the Patriot Act, of course, is its 
authorization of wiretapping.79  As Martin Neimöller once said:  
 78. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in 
scattered title numbers and sections of the U.S.C.). 
 79. See id. tit. II (Enhanced Surveillance Procedures). 
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“When they came after the communists, I did not complain because I 
was not a communist; when they came after the trade unionists, I did 
not complain because I did not belong to a union; when they came 
after the Jews, I did not complain because I was not Jewish; and when 
they came after me, there was nobody left to complain.”  If you see 
rights eroding, and fail to complain, and do not try to stop it, it will 
just get worse. 
Wiretapping has gotten worse, to the point where the most recent 
version has virtually no oversight.  Both the FBI director and the 
director of National Intelligence can authorize the gathering of 
foreign intelligence even when it involves people in the United 
States.  If a call is being made into the United States, they can 
authorize a wiretap. 
There are a lot of little parts of the wiretapping provisions that are 
troublesome.  The Act authorizes wiretapping of conversations 
involving foreign intelligence information, without any oversight, if 
foreign intelligence officials think you are talking about terrorism or 
so-called “foreign intelligence.”  “Foreign intelligence” can be 
anything that can help in foreign diplomacy, like a trade deal, or 
anything else.  In fact, anything related to diplomacy constitutes 
“foreign intelligence”—no crime needs to be alleged and the 
information will still constitute foreign intelligence as long as it will 
help in diplomacy. 
Furthermore, wiretapping can be authorized if foreign intelligence 
information is a “significant purpose” of the surveillance.  Obtaining 
foreign intelligence information does not have to be the primary 
purpose of the surveillance, but merely a significant purpose.  This, 
of course, raises a question.  If obtaining foreign intelligence 
information is not the primary purpose, then what is the primary 
purpose for the wiretap? 
A few years ago, I asked then Attorney General Gonzales what 
could be a legitimate primary purpose of surveillance if it is not 
gathering foreign intelligence?  He said that running a criminal 
investigation could be a primary purpose, which means that it would 
be possible to run the criminal investigation without needing to go 
through the aggravation of having to show probable cause before 
starting to wiretap people. 
The lack of oversight in wiretapping is also a little troublesome in 
light of the fact that this Administration has not credibly responded 
to the allegation that it abused the criminal justice process by firing 
United States Attorneys who were not indicting Democrats in time to 
effect elections.  Some U.S. Attorneys would not bring those 
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indictments, so they were fired.  U.S. Attorneys who were 
investigating Republicans were also fired.  We are now finding out 
that some U.S. Attorneys, who filed what seemed to be frivolous 
charges against Democrats in time to affect elections, kept their jobs. 
These are the allegations—that the Administration used the 
criminal justice process for partisan political purposes.  Attorney 
General Gonzales gave a response; however, other Justice 
Department officials said that he was not telling the truth.  One 
official quit, another one pleaded the Fifth, and White House officials 
are not showing up in response to subpoenas.  Are the allegations 
true?  We do not know, but we do know that the allegations have not 
been credibly responded to, and so when we consider the Patriot Act, 
we must consider the appropriateness of giving this Administration 
new power to wiretap, especially when the primary purpose of the 
wiretap is not known. 
The Act also has some interesting changes in definitions.  It says 
that a warrant is not needed in either of the following scenarios:  if 
the wiretap is directed at people both of whom are overseas; or if the 
call is “concerning” someone “believed to be overseas.”  That is a 
disconcerting idea, because if you and I are talking about Tony Blair, 
he is “believed to be overseas.”  Does that mean that Administration 
officials can tap into our conversation?  I do not know, but there is 
enough ambiguity since the words in the next section say 
notwithstanding any other law they can authorize the wiretaps. 
Obviously, once the wiretap is authorized, roving surveillance goes 
into effect, whereby the Administration can tap any phone that the 
target of the investigation is using.  And there is, in fact, no oversight.  
The only oversight is that the Administration has to file its plan with 
the court.  The court has to accept the wiretap plan unless the court 
finds that it is clearly illegal. 
The court does not decide whether or not the wiretap is legal.  If 
the wiretap is not clearly illegal, the court must approve the plan.  
Even if the court finds that the wiretap is clearly illegal, the 
Administration can appeal.  Meanwhile, the Administration can 
continue implementing its plan during the pendency of the appeal, 
which can go all the way to the Supreme Court.  During that time, 
although the court has found that the wiretap is clearly illegal, the 
Administration can still continue to implement its plan anyway.  That 
is what we have come to.  Fortunately, most of that is in the part of 
the bill that expires in six months.  But the fact that we have passed it 
at all should be extremely disturbing to a lot of people. 
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You get the sense that the Administration is really offended when 
you suggest that there need to be checks and balances.  The 
Administration acts as if you are questioning its integrity when you say 
that there ought to be checks and balances.  No, it is just checks and 
balances.  When the Administration does something, it should just 
tell the court; the court will go along with it, but humor me and tell 
the court.  And if the Administration is in a hurry, go ahead and do 
what needs to be done; just tell the court later, by utilizing provisions 
for emergency wiretaps. 
The Administration keeps saying that we need to, in balancing 
security and liberties, focus on security.  However, this is not a 
question about security and liberty because there is nothing they can 
do with this law, i.e., no oversight wiretapping, that they could not do 
before if they just stopped by the court and told the court what they 
were doing.  Or, if the Administration is in a hurry, it can do what it 
needs to do and then tell the court on the way back.  Thus, the 
Administration can do anything that would be legal without 
oversight, with a warrant, if they just go through the little process of 
obtaining a warrant.  In short, you are not balancing your rights and 
your liberties, you are just having fundamental checks and balances. 
The Administration wants to try people using military tribunals; 
unfortunately, we did not complain about that—it slid through.  
Military tribunals are not court-martials; a court-martial is a regular 
trial process.  In a military tribunal, there is no right to a public trial.  
There is only a vague right to an attorney.  There is no right against 
self-incrimination.  There is no presumption of innocence.  There is 
no need for proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
I saw one Senator ask then Attorney General Ashcroft about this:  
are you requiring guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, or some guilt 
level beyond just preponderance of the evidence—something like 
compelling, clear and convincing—and they kept going back and 
forth.  It occurred to me that the Attorney General was not even 
conceding a preponderance of the evidence standard.  It was almost 
as if a less than clearly erroneous standard could be a basis for guilt.  
But we did not complain about the standard of proof and the next 
thing we ended up with was the concept of “enemy combatant,” for 
whom the Department of Justice did not even bother to have a trial.  
The Department of Justice simply designates someone as an enemy 
combatant and locks them up, indefinitely.  No charges, no trial, 
nothing.  I asked then Attorney General Ashcroft at a hearing:  What 
happens if you have designated someone as an enemy combatant and 
they are locked up, but they are actually factually innocent of the 
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allegations?  Suppose the enemy combatant’s story is as follows:  I saw 
your informant point in my direction, but he was pointing at the 
person behind me; he was not pointing at me.  Tell me what I am 
accused of, and I can explain that it was not me.  I asked the Attorney 
General when, in this process of designation and then lockup, does 
the individual have an opportunity to make his or her case?  And the 
answer was, “At the end of the conflict.”  At the end of the war on 
terrorism, you can say that you were locked up without cause.  That is 
what you end up with when you do not take a stand.  We did not take 
a stand regarding military tribunals, and now we have people locked 
up as enemy combatants. 
If you do not take a stand against unreasonable searches and 
seizures and unreasonable criminal trials, the Administration is not 
going to stop at those parts of the Constitution; instead, it will move 
on to the other parts of the Constitution, like the First Amendment—
religious liberties.  The idea that decisions need to be based on 
principle is really nowhere to be found.  Some will take little 
innocuous cases and create very difficult analytical problems. 
Take the question of whether or not “under God” can legally be 
part of the Pledge of Allegiance required to be recited in elementary 
school.  I happen to agree with the dissent in the Ninth Circuit,80 
which said that the reference to God in the Pledge is so innocuous 
that nobody pays any attention to it and instead it is constitutionally 
meaningless.  Unfortunately, due to the fact that there have been 
several congressional resolutions,81 and people have held rallies about 
the issue, the argument that the phrase is innocuous is difficult to 
sustain. 
Moreover, what standard should be used to evaluate whether the 
phrase is constitutional?  If you are going to determine that 
something is not innocuous, what standard will you use to evaluate it?  
Should we use the coercion standard?  School children have to go to 
school and are coerced into reciting the Pledge, which is now 
considered a meaningful religious message.  So on that basis, the 
policy of reciting the Pledge would have to fail.  What about 
considering whether there is an establishment of one view of religion, 
i.e., monotheism, because the Pledge includes “under God,” not 
“gods”?  That is an establishment, so if we look at the Pledge from an 
 80. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir.) (Fernandez, J., 
dissenting), amended by 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 81. See, e.g., S. Res. 292, 107th Cong. (2002) (expressing support for the Pledge 
of Allegiance); H.R. Res. 459, 107th Cong. (2002) (expressing the House of 
Representatives’ opinion that Newdow was erroneously decided). 
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establishment analysis, it must fail.  How about the Lemon Test?82  Is 
there any secular purpose?  The Pledge used to be recited without 
the phrase “under God” in it.  The congressional resolution that put 
“under God” into the Pledge was a separate resolution83 that had no 
other purpose other than the insertion of the phrase “under God,” 
into the Pledge.  Inserting such a phrase has no secular purpose.  So 
once again, the Pledge fails.  If you are trying to have any principled 
resolution of this issue, once you give up the possibility that the 
phrase is innocuous, it has to fail. 
Sometimes we avoid any analysis at all by using something called 
“Court-Stripping.”  In other words, do not let the courts decide 
certain issues.  Congress is doing that on the issue of gay marriage by 
passing legislation stripping federal courts from having jurisdiction to 
hear cases involving the Defense of Marriage Act.  This is especially 
interesting for people in Virginia because it was those so-called 
“liberal, lifetime-appointed, activist federal judges” who declared 
Virginia’s laws prohibiting mixed race marriage unconstitutional 
even though the marriage laws were the properly enacted law in 
Virginia reflecting the will of the people.  I was happy to see those so-
called “liberal, lifetime-appointed, activist federal judges” take that 
position.  And if this “Court-Stripping” idea had been in effect back 
then, I am not sure we could have ever repealed that law (I was a 
member of the General Assembly of Virginia for fifteen years).  
Thankfully, those “liberal, lifetime-appointed, activist federal judges” 
did it for us.   
Another issue is the posting of the Ten Commandments.  Who 
wants to decide which version, the Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish 
version, of the Ten Commandments gets posted?  If you can post the 
Ten Commandments, what else can you post?  Those are questions 
that are best left to the traditional view of the Establishment Clause—
you cannot post any of them. 
Another issue is the proposed “Flag Burning Amendment.”84  
There is no analysis in any of the flag cases that makes a prohibition 
of flag burning legitimate under any analysis of the First 
 82. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (ruling that in order to 
comport with the Establishment Clause a statute must meet three criteria:  “First, the 
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect 
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . [and third,] the statute 
must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”) (citation 
omitted). 
 83. H.R.J. Res. 243, 83d Cong., 68 Stat. 294 (1954). 
 84. The most recent resolution proposing to amend the Constitution to prohibit 
the physical desecration of the U.S. flag, S.J. Res. 12, 109th Cong. (2006), did not 
pass. 
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Amendment.85  Laws can proscribe time, place, and manner of 
speech, but not content.  In actuality, this bill is called the Flag 
Desecration Amendment, not the Flag Burning Amendment, because 
its supporters do not want it to reach the American Legion.  The only 
time I have seen a flag actually burned was by the American Legion 
during a flag retirement ceremony.  Any Boy Scout will tell you that 
you dispose of a worn-out flag by holding a respectful ceremony and 
then burning the flag.  That is not “desecration,” that is respect.  
Desecration is when you have some war protestors say something that 
offends the local sheriff when they are burning the flag.  They say it is 
action, not speech.  No.  Burning the flag while saying something 
nice is okay.  But if you burn the flag and insult the sheriff, they want 
to lock you up.  Anybody who has any idea what flag burning and the 
First Amendment is all about knows that you cannot prohibit 
desecration under any principled analysis of the First Amendment. 
In other religious cases, there is a sense that if you are in the 
majority, you can get your way.  If you are a member of the majority 
religion, there are privileges that some want to enjoy that members of 
other religions cannot.  The faith-based initiative is right in the 
middle of that.86  If you boil the faith-based initiative down to its 
essentials, all it does is allow some sponsors of federally funded 
programs to discriminate with federal money.  It does not allow faith-
based groups to sponsor federally funded programs.  They can do 
that already.  Five percent of the Head Start programs are already 
sponsored by faith-based organizations.  They sponsor them just like 
everybody else.  You have to use the money for the purpose for which 
it was appropriated, and you have to abide by civil rights laws.  
Catholic charities and other groups have been getting billions of 
dollars of federal money for years, and using the money for the 
purpose for which it was appropriated.  They cannot proselytize or 
use it for a religious program, and they have to comply with civil 
rights laws.  Some religious organizations want to use their Title VII 
exemption,87 under which they can discriminate in hiring with their 
own congregation’s funding, and carry over that exemption to the 
federal money that they receive from the faith-based initiative for 
government-funded programs.  For example, the Head Start program 
would like to say to an applicant:  while you would have been a great 
 85. E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. O’Brien, 391 
U.S. 367 (1968). 
 86. See Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 31, 2001) (establishing 
the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives). 
 87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000). 
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Head Start teacher and you are the best applicant that we have, we do 
not hire people of your religion.  Moreover, discrimination based on 
religion effectively leads to discrimination based on race.  For 
example, a Head Start program employer might say to an applicant:  
just by looking at you, I can tell we do not have people who look like 
you that belong to our church.  So you cannot get a job here.  Where 
I come from, there are a lot—I do not know if it is most—but there 
are a lot of religious organizations that are, to the nearest percentage, 
one hundred percent black or one hundred percent white.  If you are 
picking people just from your church, that has racial overtones.  
Under these circumstances, if you are discriminating based on 
religion, then you are also discriminating based on race. 
I have asked some of my civil rights lawyer friends if they have ever 
heard of a racial discrimination case made against a church.  None of 
these civil rights lawyers had heard of even one such case.  Thus 
people in federally funded programs could be discriminating based 
on religion, race, and other grounds, all under the guise of religion. 
There is also another interesting aspect of this issue.  If you allow 
someone to discriminate in a federally funded program based on 
race and religion, where is your moral authority to tell a devoutly 
religious businessman what he can do with his own money?  In the 
1960s, we convinced the requisite portion of the United States that 
employment discrimination based on race or religion was so 
reprehensible that we made it illegal.  If we now allow such 
discrimination to occur in a federally funded program, we lose the 
moral authority to have any civil rights laws to tell someone what they 
have to do with their own money. 
But some believe that since we are in the majority, we can pass the 
law that will allow that kind of discrimination because, the fact of the 
matter is, our side will be doing the discriminating.  As a result, no 
harm will be done.  We are not going to be discriminated against.  In 
fact, when they talk about civil rights in this respect, they talk about 
the right of the person discriminating.  It used to be that the victim of 
discrimination was the one that had the power of the federal 
government on their side.  Now, the power of the federal government 
protects someone’s right to discriminate. 
One of the problems we have had in this debate is that it is so 
extreme that nobody believes that the debate is actually going on.  I 
have asked people the following question:  if someone offered an 
amendment that allowed some Head Start programs to tell some 
people that the programs do not hire people of their religion, what 
chance do you think that amendment would have to pass?  And their 
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response, generally, is that the provision would be unconstitutional 
and that the amendment would have no chance of passing.  And then 
I have to explain to them that these provisions have been passing the 
House for the last six or seven years; actually, we have been voting on 
this issue for almost ten years, and that a few months ago was the first 
time we actually won and prevented this type of provision from 
passing.  Every other time we lost the vote; the Republican majority 
has voted almost unanimously to allow that kind of discrimination. 
People just do not believe that this kind of discussion is going on.  
Indeed, it is still alive and well, and in some programs, they have 
actually gotten it through.  But there is a sense that if you are in the 
majority you can fix the results. 
When you talk about a “fair” trial, the idea is that you cannot fix 
the result in a trial.  The most high profile example of that was the 
Terri Schiavo case where the court system had consistently ruled on 
behalf of the next of kin, the husband.  The majority in Congress was 
offended by that decision and wanted to change the result 
legislatively.  We passed a bill88 to allow standing for the parents in 
that case simply because the majority agreed with the parents.  In the 
next case, however, we might agree with the husband, not the other 
relatives, and we would not want them in court.  So, we passed 
legislation to fix the result in that case only.  The bill actually passed 
the House by an overwhelming margin.  I think the public was pretty 
much offended that we would intervene in that kind of case.  And 
they were certainly offended by the idea that we tried to fix the result 
after it had been properly considered by the courts and there had 
been a fair resolution of the case, whether you agreed with the result 
or not. 
But it was not the only trial whose result we wrongly tried to fix.  
The NAACP and other groups have been suing gun manufacturers 
based on the idea that somebody who gets shot in the street in New 
York should be able to sue the gun manufacturer for the way that the 
gun manufacturer manufactured and distributed the firearms.89  Well, 
that is a stretch.  These plaintiffs had not won any cases, but just to 
make sure, the gun manufacturers’ lobbyist came to Congress seeking 
immunity for those organizations.  In other words, Congress decided 
that we would try the case in the legislative branch instead of letting 
the case be tried in the judicial branch, where the parties would be 
relegated to an impartial judge and jury and the same law applies to 
 88. Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 
119 Stat. 15 (2005). 
 89. E.g., NAACP v. Accusport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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everybody else.  Instead, we allowed one party to go to the legislative 
branch, where it could try to influence the result by contributing 
money to the triers, and where the result would be based on 
popularity, not the Rule of Law.  They passed the bill90 and essentially 
tried the case.  In effect, Congress gave immunity to the gun 
manufacturers in the legislative branch rather than letting the 
judicial branch take care of it. 
The fast food industry did the same thing.  There was the 
“McDonalds makes you fat” legislation,91 where people sued 
McDonalds.  The plaintiffs had not gotten anywhere, but just to make 
sure, the House passed a bill to immunize the food industry.  Again, 
no rule of law supported this, but contributions and popularity 
obviously effected the result.  They also, kind of under the radar 
screen, stuck a lot of products liability and other provisions in there.  
But we passed that bill in the House. 
One case in Northern Virginia92 that people remember—although 
I am not sure that they remember how it actually ended up—was the 
child custody case involving two doctors, Dr. Morgan and Dr. 
Foretich.  The mother had accused the husband of molesting the 
child, but visitation was ordered anyway.  She took the child, ended 
up in jail for the year, and the child ended up in Australia 
somewhere.  We entered final judgment to fix the result in that case 
in a Transportation Appropriations Conference Committee 
report93—just stuck it in a conference committee report.  When the 
bill came back for an up or down vote, Members had to decide 
whether they were in favor of federal transportation funding or not, 
with this little phrase in there that fixed the result of that case.  When 
the bill passed, the individuals came back from Australia to the 
United States.  This was not an example of the Rule of Law; Congress 
wanted their side to win, so they fixed the result. 
We have another situation in which the majority wants to enforce, 
through the Executive Branch, the disclosure of some testimony.  
They want to make reporters testify in violation of hundreds of years 
of tradition.  As a result, we are considering a Reporter Shield Law94 
that will be discussed later this afternoon. 
 90. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7901 (Supp. V 
2005). 
 91. Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. 
(2005). 
 92. Morgan v. Foretich, 521 A.2d 248 (D.C. 1987). 
 93. H.R. REP. NO. 104-785, at 14 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
 94. Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 2102, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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Attorney-client privilege:  Is there a right to attorney-client 
privilege in criminal cases or are individuals and corporations being 
coerced into waiving that privilege?  Congress is going to have to 
consider attorney-client privilege laws to make sure that individuals 
and corporations are not coerced into giving up their right to 
attorney-client privilege. 
As a result, we wonder where the Rule of Law is.  We wonder if 
some sponsors of federal programs want to use federal money for 
religious purposes.  Maybe Congress could just vote and pass that, but 
where is the Rule of Law?  They want to win a lawsuit; they just have 
the case decided by the legislative branch.  If they want to listen to 
conversations of people without probable cause of any crimes, they 
just get to listen in—there is no respect for the Rule of Law. 
If you want to protect the Constitution, then you need a strong 
ACLU.  That is why I am happy to be here this morning.  Because if it 
was not for the ACLU—in spite of all the defeats we have had—it 
would have been a lot worse.  (Laughter)  Caroline, Nadine, and 
others, thank you for your hard work, and keep up the good work. 
CAROLINE FREDRICKSON:  Thank you so much, Congressman Scott.  I 
have to say, we were starting to feel a little depressed with the litany of lawsuits 
but you picked me up there at the end; I appreciate that.  I had an interesting 
experience earlier this week on behalf of Nadine who was unable to speak to a 
group of generals.  I spoke to them about a couple of the issues that you 
mentioned here, particularly about surveillance and about the issue of military 
commissions and taking away habeas corpus rights from the detainees at 
Guantanamo.  I mentioned the role of checks and balances and how important 
it was, and they sort of looked at me, a little blankly, and then I said, just 
remember, we could be talking about President Hillary Clinton.  Then they all 
started nodding—all right, checks and balances.  (Laughter) 
In light of what you mentioned about checks and balances and, in 
particular, the way that this Administration has used the State Secrets 
Privilege and classified documents to such an extent, how does Congress 
perform its role as a check on the Executive Branch in a world where the 
Executive Branch denies Congress access to information, and where the courts 
are cut out as well? 
CONGRESSMAN SCOTT:  The right of Congress to get 
information under those circumstances is partly legal, but mostly 
political because as we try to get information and enforce subpoenas, 
public opinion really comes into play and politicians get punished for 
stepping overboard.  When the Administration claims executive 
privilege, it gets away with it unless it is clearly overstepping, because 
if we try to enforce a subpoena, the judicial branch must order the 
  
1260 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1203 
enforcement of the subpoena.  But the public is actively involved 
during that process. 
When they say something is classified, it is a curious process.  I 
asked the Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, if 
there was some process by which they classify and declassify—so that 
you know when something is classified, and if it is no longer 
classified, you know when it was declassified—because we frequently 
find at congressional hearings that individuals would say, “Oh, no 
that is classified.”  Then, the next day, we would watch CNN and they 
would be discussing the issue that we had asked about.  Well, when 
was it declassified?  When Vice President Cheney or the head of the 
National Intelligence decided to blurt it out—the minute they blurt it 
out—is it no longer classified or is there some process, is there some 
federal record when things are declassified?  We do not know.   
Then there is the issue of trying to get information from 
uncooperative executive branch officials.  We went through this in 
the U.S. Attorney situation, where people tried to rephrase the 
questions we were asking to make the issue about whether the 
President has the authority to use politics in selecting and firing U.S. 
Attorneys.  Of course he does; that is an easy question.  But that was 
not the issue.  The issue was:  does he have the right to obstruct 
justice by firing and threatening to fire people unless they file 
frivolous charges to get a partisan political result?  I think that is the 
question that we need to ask, and we have not gotten an answer to 
that question.  One official quit and another accused Attorney 
General Gonzales of not telling the truth; one admitted under oath 
that she had “crossed the line,” and some will not show for 
subpoenas.  It has been very difficult to get any information.   
Some of the Republican-appointed U.S. Attorneys alleged that they 
were fired because they did not follow the partisan-political agenda.  
Now these are not left-wing Democrats, these are Republican 
appointees saying this.  And we have not been able to get information 
even though we subpoenaed Administration officials; they just 
decided not to show up.  I hope we are going to make it clear that the 
alleged acts constitute obstruction of justice, so I do not think we are 
going to just drop it.  I think we are going to continue to try to get 
information, but we have been trying to get the most mundane 
information and it has clearly taken a long time.   
What you suggested is a challenging problem.  We are working with 
it—the U.S. Attorneys question and the wiretap question.  We are not 
getting many answers.  Part of the problem is this Administration has 
had essentially no oversight.  Congress has not been a check and 
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balance, rather Congress has been more of a cheerleader for the 
Administration.  For several years, whatever the Administration 
wanted to do, Congress did not question it; instead, they tried to sell 
it.  Now, the Administration actually has to answer questions, and it is 
a new experience. 
CAROLINE FREDRICKSON:  That is certainly different from my 
experience in the Clinton Administration.  Well, thank you very much for your 
answer.  Congressman, you mentioned a couple of issues earlier with the 
Reporter Shield Legislation.  That is obviously a very critical factor, as well as 
whistleblower protection, to ensure that congressional oversight is 
complemented by the access that the press has to information and protections 
for the press, as well as opportunities for whistleblowers to come forward. 
CONGRESSMAN SCOTT:  The problem with the Reporter Shield 
Law is that you never needed one on a federal level because people 
were reasonable.  You just did not press so hard to get a reporter to 
testify.  Now, they are just throwing reporters in jail.  There has always 
been a balance between the reporters’ right to get information, and 
the Executive Branch and judicial branch right to get the 
information.  There has always been a tension, and we have always 
been able to work it out because everybody was reasonable, so you did 
not have this problem.  Now, we have this problem. 
There also was no need for an attorney-client privilege statute 
because people were always reasonable.  Now, we need to consider 
this kind of legislation.95  There was never any need for direction 
about whether or not the Executive Branch could invade a 
congressional office the way they did where they just went in and took 
everything.  They do not just go in and grab a discrete piece of 
evidence, like drugs in the bottom-left drawer, get the drugs, and 
come out.  Now they come out with all the computers, all of the 
legislative work, everything.  This never happened in centuries, and 
then it happened.  If a legislative agency went over to the White 
House and went into Karl Rove’s office and started to leave with his 
computer so that Nancy Pelosi’s staff could look at his computer files, 
people would understand what the problem is.  We need to respect 
each other.  They could have worked together to get the necessary 
information.  The Executive Branch officials could have worked with 
the Capitol Police to figure out how to get into the office to get the 
necessary information.  Instead they just sent the Executive Branch 
officials there with a subpoena; and while I do not think there is any 
 95. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, H.R. Res. 3013, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
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question that they had that right, there is a reason why it had never 
happened before.  When you are dealing with an administration that 
is right on the edge, pushing the envelope time and time again, and 
when you have never had to deal with these types of questions that we 
are now having to deal with, it makes things difficult.  We will keep 
doing the best we can.  I think the public sentiment will turn and 
make life very difficult for the Administration.  And there are things 
you can do with a majority of Congress; Congress can start to override 
vetoes.  And there are other things that you can do if you have 
enough public support behind you. 
B. Congressman Mike Pence∗
Thank you all.  I had to check my schedule twice this morning to 
see if I was given the right schedule, and I was handed the right 
schedule.  I am at the ACLU conference.  Thank you very much.  
Honestly on this issue, there is very little daylight between the historic 
work of this great national champion of civil liberties and the First 
Amendment and this Indiana Congressman.  Thank you for the 
opportunity to be here. 
I am a conservative Republican.  I like to tell people I am a 
conservative, but I am not in a bad mood about it.  (Laughter)  
Hopefully some of the work that I, and my counterpart and mentor, 
Senator Richard Lugar from Indiana, have done in the last three 
years to attempt to put a stitch in what I believe is a tear in the First 
Amendment freedom of the press, provides some evidence of the 
commonality of these ideas among Americans of diverse views, 
politically and ideologically.  I think all of us, as Americans, cherish 
the blood-bought liberties that are found and enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights. 
I want to speak to you about those liberties today.  It is particularly 
momentous to be able to come before you today because the 
legislation that we introduced three years ago, the Free Flow of 
Information Act,96 colloquially referred to as the “Federal Media 
Shield Bill,” was marked up this summer and reported for the first 
time ever out of the House Judiciary Committee.  As I speak to you 
today, the Senate Judiciary Committee is marking up and considering 
the Free Flow of Information Act in the United States Senate.  
Indeed, we may well have news before dinner tonight that the Free 
Flow of Information Act and this Federal Media Shield Bill has 
 ∗  Congressman, Sixth Congressional District of Indiana. 
 96. H.R. Res. 581, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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arrived at a place that heretofore was unattainable despite one 
hundred legislative efforts since the early 1970s. 
Let me speak to you about the legislation, and then I would like to 
take questions.  I used to do a call-in radio show.  My wife listened to 
it occasionally (Laughter)—and just occasionally—and I would always 
ask her, “Well, how do you think the show went?”  And she would say, 
“Well, it got really good after you started taking calls,” (Laughter) 
which told me that I am probably better at dialogue than 
monologues.  So before I have to cut away here, I would love to get 
into a dialogue with you all about how we have been building this 
legislation and about some of the challenges that we have faced. 
Colonel Robert R. McCormick, the grandson of the founder of the 
Chicago Tribune, wrote words that are now chiseled into the wall of the 
lobby of that newspaper’s building.  I think these words are an 
appropriate starting point in this discussion.  He wrote, “The 
newspaper is an institution developed by modern civilization to 
present the news of the day . . . and to furnish that check upon 
government which no constitution has ever been able to provide.” 
Occasionally reporters have approached me over the last three 
years, and said, “Now, I saw you doing a Federal Media Shield Bill.”  
And I say, “Right.”  They say, “Do you think the media is kind of 
liberal or . . . .”  And I say, “Oh, yeah, the national media is terribly 
liberal in my view; it is very biased.”  And they say, “Well, you know, 
this kind of helps reporters do . . . .”  They are kind of checking my 
IQ; generally, in my experience, this is always a good thing to do with 
Republicans.  (Laughter)  But then they look to the left, look to the 
right, and they kind of say, “Hey, thanks.”  (Laughter)  And I tell 
them, number one, as an American, you are welcome.  But number 
two, let me assure you, this legislation is not about protecting 
reporters; it is about protecting the public’s right to know.  Then I 
generally go on to explain that as a conservative who believes in 
limited government, I think that a free and independent press is the 
only check on government power in real time. 
We often speak about elections and we often speak about the 
accountability of the democratic process.  But even a casual observer 
of American government understands that elections come and go in 
different bi-annual intervals.  The day-in and day-out, antiseptic of 
free and independent press is truly the only limit on government 
power upon which we can rely.  I think our founders enshrined in the 
First Amendment those words, “Congress shall make no law . . . 
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abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,”97 for precisely that 
reason.  The Constitution enshrined, I believe, a Republic which is 
defined by its limited nature and the limited scope of its powers.  Our 
founders certainly did not include protections of the press in the First 
Amendment because they got good press.  All you have to do is 
Google me once to find out that I occasionally put my foot in my 
mouth and pay for it in the press.  But again, as someone who 
believes in limited government, it is my conviction that a free and 
independent press is the only check on government power in real 
time, and conservatives and liberals ought to be able to understand 
and embrace this. 
Thomas Jefferson warned, “[O]ur liberty . . . cannot be guarded 
but by the freedom of the press, nor that be limited without danger 
of losing it.”98  During the last three years, we have been working on a 
bipartisan basis.  Senator Lugar, Senator Dodd, Chairman Leahy, 
former Chairman Specter, and I are working with Congressman Rick 
Boucher, along with the original co-sponsor, Chairman Conyers of 
the Judiciary Committee, and the distinguished member, Republican 
Member Howard Coble.  We have come together on a bipartisan 
basis to advance a very simple principle.  That principle is to take 
those words of the First Amendment to heart, and to take an 
important step toward repairing what I think is a tear in the First 
Amendment freedom of the press. 
Not long ago, reporters’ assurance of confidentiality was 
unquestionable.  That assurance led to sources providing information 
to reporters who then brought forward news of extraordinary 
consequences in the life of the nation like Watergate, where 
government corruption and misdeeds were brought to light by the 
dogged persistence of a free and independent press.  However, the 
press cannot, this day, make the same assurance of confidentiality to 
sources.  I say with a heavy heart, we face a real danger in America 
today that there may never be another Deep Throat. 
In recent years, reporters, like Judith Miller, have been jailed.  
James Taricani was placed on house arrest, and both Mark Fainaru-
Wada and Lance Williams were threatened with jail terms.  
Protections provided by the Free Flow of Information Act are 
necessary so members of the media can bring forward information to 
the American public without fear of retribution or prosecution, and 
so sources will continue to come forward.  Compelling reporters to 
 97. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 98. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay (Jan. 25, 1786), in 5 THE WORKS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 73 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed., The Knickerbocker Press 1904). 
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testify, and in particular, compelling them to reveal their confidential 
sources, is unquestionably a detriment to the public interest.  
Without the promise of confidentiality, many important conduits of 
information about our government will be shut down.  The 
dissemination of information by the media to the public on matters 
ranging from the operation of government, to events in our local 
communities, is invaluable to the operation of a democracy.  Not only 
in cases involving corruption, but also in cases involving the 
expenditure of billions of dollars by future generations of Americans; 
a free and independent press is an essential element in that cause. 
Without the free flow of information from sources to reporters, I 
submit that the public will be ill-equipped to make informed choices 
as an informed electorate.  This is not to say the press is without fail 
or always gets the story right.  One of my favorite quotes from James 
Madison is where he wrote, “To the press alone, checkered [sic] as it 
is with abuses, the world is indebted for all the triumphs which have 
been gained by reason and humanity, over error and 
oppression . . . .”99
As a conservative, I believe the concentration of power should be 
subject to great scrutiny.  Integrity in government is not a Democratic 
or Republican issue.  And corruption, sadly, cannot be laid at the feet 
of any one particular political party.  When scandal hits either party, 
or any branch of government, or any institution of our society, it 
wounds our nation.  The longer I serve in Congress, the more firmly I 
believe in the wisdom of our Founders, especially as it pertains to the 
First Amendment freedom of the press.  It is imperative that we 
preserve the transparency and integrity of the American government, 
and the only way to do that is by ensuring a free and independent 
press. 
It is important to note the legislation that will be considered in the 
Senate today, that we have introduced to move in the House Judiciary 
Committee, is not a radical step.  Thirty-two states and the District of 
Columbia have various statutes that protect reporters from being 
compelled to testify or disclose sources of information in court.  
Seventeen states have protections for reporters as a result of judicial 
decisions.  The Free Flow of Information Act would simply set 
national standards similar to those that represent the law of most 
 99. James Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in THE VIRGINIA AND 
KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF 1788 AND ‘99:  WITH JEFFERSON’S ORIGINAL DRAUGHT 
THEREOF; ALSO, MADISON’S REPORT, CALHOUN’S ADDRESS, RESOLUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL 
STATES IN RELATION TO STATE RIGHTS; WITH OTHER DOCUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE 
JEFFERSONIAN DOCTRINES OF ‘98, at 36 (Jonathan Elliot, ed., Washington 1832).  
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states.  I would submit to you that not only has the legislation been a 
productive compromise, as all legislation is, it has also been carefully 
crafted after reviewing the internal Department of Justice guidelines 
and state shield laws as templates. 
The legislation puts forth, in very specific terms, a qualified 
privilege, which I believe strikes an appropriate balance between the 
public’s need for information and the fair administration of justice.  
In most instances under our legislation, a reporter will be able to use 
the shield provided in the bill to refrain from testifying, providing 
documents, or revealing a confidential source.  However, I want to be 
clear.  The privilege is not absolute or unlimited.  Different issues are 
raised in state jurisdictions, and one has to acknowledge that at the 
national level, there are different issues as well.  The part of our 
government that is charged with providing for the common defense 
has different pressures and different challenges than state or local 
governments ever can or will have.  On that basis, testimony of 
documents can be forced only if all reasonable alternative sources 
have been exhausted, and the testimony or document sources are 
critical to a criminal prosecution or civil case, and a judge determines 
that the public interest in compelling disclosure outweighs the public 
interest in gathering or disseminating news or information.  The 
addition of this balancing test ensures that a full and fair 
consideration will be given to both sides in the determination of 
whether a reporter must testify or turn over documents.  Specifically, 
in a situation where a reporter is being asked to reveal the identity of 
a confidential source, the bill provides several exceptions whereby the 
reporter can be compelled to reveal the source. 
Before going into that issue, I have never spoken to Bob Woodward 
about this, and I suspect many of you in the room have talked 
through these issues with him, but from my reading of his work in the 
past and following the disclosure of the identity of Deep Throat, it 
seemed to me that the one overwhelming issue for that source was 
that his name never be revealed to the public.  The truth is that 
under the law in Supreme Court decisions that existed at the time, 
Bob Woodward could give that assurance to that source.  Let me 
emphasize again, that assurance cannot be given today.  I think that 
this is having, as the subject of this conference suggests, a chilling 
effect on men and women, and that it is also influencing the 
willingness of people like me to talk to people like some of you in this 
room, who carry a pen and a pad for a living.  We do not know when 
it is happening—that is the very nature of the chilling effect since it is 
impossible to assess the impact of it—but we know it is happening. 
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It is hard for me to look at the recent Judith Miller case, whatever 
you make of it, in which the revealing of a CIA official was at the very 
core of that case.  A White House official, now convicted of perjury—
answering to the law—began that case by telling what was, in that 
moment, the truth to a reporter off the record.  Indeed, there was a 
falsehood that was found before the grand jury later, but I want you 
to ponder that for a moment and ask yourself what signal that sends 
to people like me.  When a reporter walks up and says, “Seriously just 
off the record, what is going on here?”  That case stands as one of 
many monuments to the fact that reporters cannot protect 
confidential sources, and I believe it is having an effect today, in real 
time, on the free flow of information. 
Specifically, regarding the situation where a reporter is being asked 
to reveal the identity of a confidential source, our bill provides several 
exceptions.  In order for a reporter to be compelled to reveal a 
source, the situation has to fall specifically in one of these exceptions.  
Sources can be revealed under exceptions for national security where 
an imminent threat of bodily harm or death exists.  There is an 
exception where trade secrets have been revealed, or where personal 
health or financial information has been revealed in violation of the 
law.  We added further clarification in the Judiciary Committee to 
those exceptions.  Under the manager’s amendment, compelled 
disclosure of a source will only be permitted if it is necessary to 
prevent—here we changed the language—terrorism or a significant 
specific harm to national security.  Also under the manager’s 
amendment, it prevented the shield privilege from being claimed by 
a foreign power or agents of a foreign power. 
Our legislation has also dealt with the whole question of who does 
this apply to, whom are covered persons under the bill.  Under our 
legislation, covered persons are those able to use the shield, and 
frankly, there is a lot of discussion about Congress defining who is a 
journalist.  I am somewhat troubled at the very prospect of that 
project.  In this legislation we have attempted to make it clear that a 
covered person is engaged in journalism for financial gain or 
livelihood and that no terrorist will be able to qualify.  Other than 
that, it is a very, very broad definition and it may yet be broader.  At 
the close of the Judiciary Committee’s mark-up where we reported 
this bill for the first time, Chairman Conyers challenged the members 
to form a working group to deal with several issues, including the 
definition of a journalist, and that working group is diligently 
pursuing this. 
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I know the ACLU has had significant input on the development of 
this legislation and that it is participating through counsel in the 
working group.  We are grateful for that leadership.  The objective 
here—and this comes from someone who first filed the shield bill 
providing for an absolute privilege—is to read the First Amendment 
and know that there is not an asterisk next to it.  But the nature of 
the legislative process and the challenges to the national government 
regarding national security lead us to try to shape that qualified 
privilege.  It does seem to me, however, that we need to guard against 
distorting it into a manner whereby, for instance, corporations could 
publish a newsletter and then claim a media shield protection.  We 
want to cover people that are involved in the journalistic enterprise in 
large ways or in small ways. 
Lastly, it is important to know what the bill does not do.  It does 
not give reporters a license to break the law in the name of news 
gathering, and it does not give them the right to interfere with police 
or prosecutors who are trying to prevent crimes.  It leaves laws on 
classified information unchanged.  It simply gives journalists certain 
rights and abilities to seek sources and report appropriate 
information without fear of intimidation or imprisonment.  Just as, in 
the public interest, we allow psychiatrists, clergy, and social workers to 
maintain confidences.  This is not really a radical thought.  With such 
a qualified privilege, reporters will be ensured the ability to get the 
American people the information they need to make informed 
choices.  As I said before, I believe a free and independent press is 
the only agency in America that has complete freedom to hold the 
government accountable. 
I am someone that likes to crack open the Old Book from time to 
time.  And the day of our mark-up, I was reading in my morning 
devotional time and I came across a verse in the Bible that simply 
challenged the reader to stand firm and to not let himself be 
burdened again by the yoke of slavery, adding that it was for freedom 
that Christ set us free.  I had to ponder that as I went in, and I ended 
up making those comments as I closed my remarks in the Judiciary 
Committee that day. 
In a very real sense, it was for purposes of freedom that our 
Founders, many of whom shared my Christian convictions, enshrined 
the freedom of press in the First Amendment.  The American people, 
interested parties, and members of Congress all should seize this 
legislative moment to stand firm and not let ourselves be burdened 
by any yoke or any action that infringes on our fundamental 
freedoms as Americans. 
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I want to thank the ACLU for its strong support of a media shield 
in a very real sense and for its partnership in this legislative project.  
And I hope, and literally pray, that before this Congress is out, we will 
see a strong bipartisan vote in the House and the Senate that sends to 
the President of the United States legislation that will repair this tear 
in the First Amendment; it will strengthen the free and independent 
press for generations to come.  Thank you very much.  I am happy to 
take questions. 
QUESTION:  What are the prospects of the legislation passing when it 
reports out of the Senate Judiciary Committee? 
CONGRESSMAN PENCE:  When I introduced this bill in the last 
Congress, the then Republican chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee, Jim Sensenbrenner, expressed a willingness to consider 
the bill in our Committee, and told me that the challenge, given the 
nature of the rules of the Senate, is the Senate Judiciary Committee.  
So in the last Congressional session, we focused on, with the strong 
support of Chairman Specter, trying to achieve progress in the Senate 
Judiciary Committee by having not one, but I think two, maybe three, 
hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee.  I continue to 
believe that, in terms of the foot race that we are involved in, the 
highest hurdle we are going to have to overcome could be today. 
There is some word, however, that one of the members of the 
Senate has asked for a one week delay, and that may bump us a week.  
But the ability of one member of the Judiciary Committee to put a 
hold on a piece of legislation is pretty heady stuff.  One member can 
say I do not want to proceed and announce a filibuster and that 
pretty much kills it.  We are cautiously optimistic that the version that 
has been introduced in the Senate which, I am very humbled to say is 
largely based on the version we have been producing in the House 
with many improvements, could pass.  Then, I think it is just a matter 
of organizations like the ACLU and freedom-loving groups—on the 
left, right, and in the center—around the country clamoring for the 
Congress to move this onto the floor.  I have no doubt that if the Free 
Flow of Information Act was brought to the floor of the House of 
Representatives, it would receive a decisive bipartisan vote. 
Some of my less cheerful conservative colleagues may be not be 
able to be persuaded, (Laughter) but you would be surprised.  Some 
of the most ardent conservatives on the House Judiciary Committee 
voted in favor of reporting our bill.  I will let them name names, but I 
was very humbled by that.  It was truly a bipartisan vote in the 
Committee, and I believe it would be a bipartisan vote on the floor. 
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But I cannot emphasize enough that in my seventh year in 
Congress, there is what I call the gale force wind that would do 
something—to borrow an old economic term describing the only real 
power in Washington, D.C.  Okay.  When the American people say 
“Do it,” Congress usually says “Okay” because it has been said the 
Congress does two things well:  nothing and overreact.  (Laughter)  
So we are trying to make sure that by the time they get the message, 
the country actually cherishes a free and independent press. 
I represent a district in Eastern Indiana that is a rural district and 
includes Muncie, Anderson, and other little towns.  People stop me 
on the street when they hear Senator Lugar and I have been working 
on this, and they say, “You know, that is really great you are doing 
that.”  Because people understand that reporters are on their side.  
They do not like reporters anymore than they like us, but they 
understand reporters are on their side.  To the extent that we can 
convey to the American people that this is not about protecting 
reporters, but rather about protecting the people’s right to know, 
then people e-mail, phone, write and clamor in support of this.  I 
have no doubt that we would be able to move this legislation in this 
Congress, if that occurs.  Thank you for the question. 
QUESTION:  Could you talk a little more about the definition of these bills, 
the reporters, and how that might have stalled progress in the past? 
CONGRESSMAN PENCE:  Yes.  I would have to ask Josh, who is my 
legal counsel here, to give you an exact number of versions covered, 
but let me tell you that the first version apparently applied to some 
journalists, but not to bloggers.  That did not go over very well in the 
blogosphere.  (Laughter)  When I Googled my name a couple of 
years ago and my hard drive crashed, (Laughter) I realized that 
maybe we have a problem here.  We have really been trying to go 
hammer and tongue on that.  Here, is the tension.  Because whether 
you are a Matt Drudge who is making phone calls and posting things 
on the Internet, when he was doing it on his own, it sure seemed like 
he was involved in the journalistic enterprise to me.  But what you 
want to avoid is creating a new qualified privilege in the sense of a 
shield to people that are actually not involved in the enterprise of 
journalism.  I mentioned the corporate newsletter would be one 
example.  We try to deal with this in the definition—that subsidiary 
corporations cannot acquire a privilege for the corporate parent.  For 
example, take GE—it seems like they own everything.  But if GE owns 
a television network that has a news division, and the corporation 
ends up involved in a federal case, can it claim the privilege?  GE 
would argue that it is a media company, so this law applies.  That has 
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been the tension that we have been facing and we have the widest 
possible definition of people involved.  The word “livelihood” seems 
like one that Republicans and Democrats on the Committee felt 
pretty good about.  If you make a living doing this, that might be a 
good test. 
The other thing that we also want to focus on is the issue of news-
gathering or fact-gathering.  I am actually the first member of 
Congress to have a blog.  I think half of the Members of Congress 
have blogs, but the New York Times put me in its big write-up because 
we blog in my office and because I blog from all over the world.  I am 
not a journalist.  And the very fact that I put information on the 
Internet or link people to articles that I think are compelling and 
interesting does not mean that I think the law should necessarily 
extend additional legal protections to me.  That is another part of the 
challenge that we face.  But I would love for you to take a look at our 
latest iteration.  I read all my e-mail, all my mail, and I would love to 
have your thoughts on it. 
 
